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Expungement relief was introduced in the mid-twentieth century to reward and
incentivize rehabilitation for arrestees and ex-oﬀenders and to protect their privacy.
Recently, many states have broadened their expungement remedies, and those
remedies remain useful given the negative eﬀects of public criminal records on reentry.
But recent scholarship has suggested an “uptake gap,” meaning many who are eligible
never obtain relief. Despite broadening eligibility, petitioners face substantial obstacles
to filing, pre-hearing hurdles, waiting periods, and diﬃcult standards of review
without the assistance of counsel. And even when expungement is granted, the
recipients are basically left on their own to guarantee the eﬃcacy of the remedy. Some
of these attributes of expungement were originally conceived as features, designed to
ensure only the most rehabilitated received relief, allowing the state to continue to
pursue public safety objectives with public criminal records. But the cold reality of
expungement procedure leaves many petitioners facing insurmountable obstacles that
amplify the eﬀects of the punishment originally imposed.
In exploring this reality, this Article illustrates that expungement procedure is
stuck in a rehabilitative and privacy-centric paradigm. While this framework
inspired the creation of expungement remedies and recent reforms, it also has justified
onerous procedural obstacles and the placing of the burden of persuasion on the
petitioner rather than the state. Outside of automated expungement, which is still
relatively rare and restricted to only certain types of petitions, most expungement
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regimes in substance or through procedure invert what should be the state’s burden to
justify retention of criminal records that enable extra punishment by state and private
actors. An alternative theoretical basis for expungement is necessary to convince
policymakers and decision-makers of the need for broader substantive and procedural
reform.
This Article suggests a diﬀerent paradigm: retributive based expungement. It
proposes that incorporating retributive constraints that already underlie the criminal
system can benefit petitioners. Plenty of arrestees do not deserve stigma and exoﬀenders have done their time, meaning punitive stigma from public criminal records
can amount to unwarranted punishment. A retributive-minded expungement
procedure would all but guarantee expungement in the case of arrests, where the
desert basis is questionable, and would place the burden of proof on the state for
convictions once desert has been satisfied. As such, this approach can supplement the
case for broader eligibility, automated expungement, and favorable pre-hearing
procedures that limit the uptake gap. It also has legal and political viability given that
many states already maintain retributivist constraints on sentencing and given that
huge swaths of the public perceive desert as a crucial component of any criminal
justice issue. In fact, some states are already moving in this direction and can serve
as a model for the rest of the country. In short, retributivist constraints can trim
procedural overgrowth to supplement substantive reforms that already recognize the
disproportionate eﬀects of a public criminal record.
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INTRODUCTION
The “expungement process” is a disjunctive legal concept. Whereas the
term “expungement”1 promises the hopeful wiping away and creation of a
blank slate, “process” conveys time, ordeal, and mechanics. For some time,
these processes have been justiﬁed as necessary adjuncts to the expungement
remedy—features designed to ensure that only the truly worthy petitioners
have their records wiped clean.2 This Article takes a diﬀerent view, suggesting
expungement procedures are a problem, and that their existence stems from
a problematic theoretical conception of expungement itself. In particular, the
combination of rehabilitative logic and concerns for public safety has let the
process, in short, prevent more expungement.3 And it is those processes that
must be scrutinized if substantive expungement law—which has undergone
dramatic reforms in numerous states nationwide4—is to attain for petitioners
what it promises to provide.
Nearly every jurisdiction in the United States promises some form of
expungement relief to some subset of individuals who have encountered the
criminal justice system.5 Available remedies come in diﬀerent shapes and
1 ”Expungement” has diﬀerent meanings in diﬀerent jurisdictions. For purposes of this Article,
it is meant to include, unless speciﬁed otherwise, the range of outcomes associated with the term,
including erasure, sealing, set-asides, and other terminology. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY deﬁnes
expungement of record as “the removal of a conviction (esp. for a ﬁrst oﬀense) from a person’s criminal
record.” Expungement of Record, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
2 See infra Section II.B.
3 This is, of course, a reference to the much more famous arguments made in the classic work
by Malcolm Feeley. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 199-200, 241 (1992).
4 See infra Section III.A.
5 See 50-State Comparison: Expungement, Sealing & Other Record Relief, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. RESTORATION OF RTS. PROJECT (Oct. 2020),
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-proﬁles/50-state-comparisonjudicial-expungementsealing-and-set-aside [https://perma.cc/FW5F-KMFC].
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sizes, with broader eligibility in some states, and relatively narrow relief
available in others.6 Initially applicable to just arrests, over two-thirds of
states have now extended relief to convictions.7 The number of attempted
reforms has been signiﬁcant over the past decade, ushering in a new era of
expungement, at least in theory.8 The arrival of a few “clean slate” laws and
automated expungement procedures promise more than many ever thought
would be possible.9 But the majority of substantive reforms have not been
matched with attention to the procedures accompanying the provision of
relief, rendering the promise hollow for many.
Procedure is one aspect of a multi-factored “uptake gap” that undermines
the broader utility of expungement.10 Few who have contacted the criminal
justice system know expungement even exists, learning about their eligibility
only through the eﬀorts of legal aid and other attorneys.11 The average
petitioner must jump through several hoops, which come in various forms, in
order to obtain an expungement. First, there are the initial mounds of
paperwork that require the petitioner’s attention, and in many instances, the
assistance of costly12 or overworked counsel13—counsel that is not guaranteed
despite the punitive eﬀects of a criminal record.14 Petitions require careful

Id.
Id.
See Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments at the
State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 362, 369 (2016) (describing that, between
2009 and 2014, because of increased interest in criminal law reform, over sixty percent of states
attempted to broaden their expungement laws).
9 For example, Pennsylvania enacted the Clean Slate Act, which automates expungement for
certain types of charges and conviction information. New Jersey and a few other states have similar
new laws. See infra Section III.A.
10 J.J. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, Expungement of Criminal Convictions: An Empirical Study, 133
HARV. L. REV. 2460, 2486-87, 2501-06 (2020) (describing the issue of uptake gaps and listing and
analyzing six factors explaining these gaps: lack of information, administrative hassle and time
constraints, fees and costs, distrust and fear in the criminal justice system, lack of access to counsel,
and insuﬃcient motivation to pursue expungement).
11 See LENORE ANDERSON, JOHN CUTLER, JAY JORDAN, ROBERT ROOKS & JASON
ZIEDENBERG, ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUST., CREATING MODEL LEGISLATIVE RELIEF FOR
PEOPLE WITH PAST CONVICTIONS 7 (2019), https://allianceforsafetyandjustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/Model-Policies-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/QS2T-46YL] (describing how
awareness of expungement relief remained remarkably low despite a public relations campaign in
the wake of new legislation in California).
12 The author is mindful of his time as an expungement attorney in Southeastern Pennsylvania,
where private attorneys routinely charged thousands of dollars to help prepare expungement petitions
for wealthy petitioners, effectively funneling all other petitions to overwhelmed legal aid organizations.
13 Legal aid entities often conduct the most expungement work, but are resource-strapped.
14 The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution does not aﬀord a right to counsel in
expungement proceedings, and many other post-disposition contexts, as they are not “critical stages”
relating to guilt or innocence. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 218 (2008).
6
7
8
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attention to detail, the retrieval of numerous government documents, and
interpretation of and compliance with state, local, and judicial rules.15
Second, there are the tangible and time-based obstacles. Petitioners might
have to travel to multiple oﬃces to obtain identity-validating information,
such as ﬁngerprints, to enable multiple state agencies to communicate
seamlessly. These trips are not free, and the immediate opportunity cost can
be high: a missed day of work and pay, or the need to hire a costly babysitter.
These realities can discourage the indigent from applying in the ﬁrst place.
For those who can aﬀord the fees, the tradeoﬀ might still not seem apparent.
Despite that there are expungement clinics and legal advocates willing to
assist, the general knowledge of potential petitioners about their rights and
such resources remains low.16 Third, assuming a petitioner can ﬁle the
requisite petitions, hurdles remain in the form of objecting prosecutors,17
agencies refusing to coordinate,18 and diﬃcult standards of review placing the
burden of persuasion on the petitioner.19
These obstacles, for some, are features of expungement law. They
purportedly identify those who are serious about reentry, eﬀectively
rehabilitated, and motivated to better themselves. In short, they operate to
delineate who is worthy of expungement by clarifying who has the
appropriate character after encountering the criminal justice system. But in
an era when the stigmatizing eﬀect of public criminal record history
information—often sold by jurisdictions to private parties—is undeniable,
irrespective of the person’s individual character (reformed or not), these
ostensible features are better understood as bugs. They are actually eating
away at the core promise underlying expungement regimes, a promise that

15 For example, in Philadelphia, expungement petitions have a particular set of formal requirements
that comport with local rules of the court. See FIRST JUD. DIST. OF PA., PETITION FOR EXPUNGEMENT
PURSUANT TO PA. R. CRIM. P. 790, https://www.courts.phila.gov/pdf/forms/criminal/Expungement790.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHE3-EBUU]. Petitions that deviate from those rules, even submitted by pro
se petitioners, can be denied on technical grounds. PA. R. CRIM. P. 790. If they are granted, their
malformation often prevents their efficacy.
16 Prescott & Starr, supra note 10, at 2502; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11, at 7.
17 See Brian M. Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters? Prosecutorial Discretion and Expungement, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2846, 2848 (2018) (describing the various ways that a prosecutor can
impede the expungement process).
18 See Abigail E. Horn, Wrongful Collateral Consequences, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 315, 332
(2019) (describing mismatching of records between agencies). The author recalls his time as a legal
aid attorney, spending hours on the phone with the State Police to match records with those that
existed in the court system. State statutes often task petitioners with coordinating the eﬀorts of
multiple agencies. See infra Section III.B.
19 Diﬀerent jurisdictions approach expungement adjudication diﬀerently. Some have high
burdens, others low, and still others mixed. See infra Section III.B.2.
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has been veriﬁed by recent studies that show the positive impact of
expungement on recidivism and employment.20
Why is expungement procedure so complicated and diﬃcult? This Article
advances the following theory: these obstacles are the fruits of the original
expungement paradigm that was built on two pillars: (1) rehabilitative logic
and (2) privacy concerns. These were balanced with the public safety interests
of the state, giving rise to moderate expungement regimes in the midtwentieth century. This paradigm has driven action in the expungement area
since. Expungement laws rose to prominence in an era when rehabilitation
dominated public policy discussions about punishment.21 These discussions
had great virtue and, in fact, shifted sentencing regimes away from a singular
focus on extremely punitive responses to crime. But, like many public
policies, reliance on rehabilitation also had unintended consequences. One
such consequence of the focus on rehabilitation was a system of expungement
procedures designed to locate the most rehabbed individuals, or least “risky
bet,” by placing the onus squarely on the ex-oﬀender or ex-arrestee. The result
was a set of expungement regimes that forced the petitioner to prove her
mettle by navigating a world of byzantine procedures and onerous substantive
requirements, with decision-makers attempting to balance the petitioner’s
privacy interests against the public safety goals of the state.22
That makes sense when rehabilitation is the underlying goal of corrections
and when public safety rationales dominate the administration of the criminal
system. Indeterminate sentencing regimes, governed by parole boards and
probation oﬃcers, operated the same way, looking to proof of rehabilitation
as the exit pass from the criminal justice system.23 A rehabilitative focus
allows the state to simultaneously work towards reforming individuals and
manage public safety by requiring more and more corrective behavior on the
part of those sentenced. And during the completion of a direct sentence, there
is cause for that approach.
The problem, however, is that in the context of expungement,
rehabilitative premises invert what should be the calculus regarding
20 See generally Jeﬀrey Selbin, Justin McCrary & Joshua Epstein, Unmarked? Criminal Record
Clearing and Employment Outcomes, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2018) (discussing the
positive impacts of legal record clearing remedies, including subsequent increases in employment
rates and real average earnings).
21 Sarah Glazer, Sentencing Reform, 24 CQ RESEARCHER 27, 30-31 (2014); Joy Radice, The
Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1326, 1370 (2017).
22 See infra Section II.B.
23 See TONY WARD & SHADD MARUNA, REHABILITATION: BEYOND THE RISK PARADIGM
8-23 (2007) (reframing the debate from “[w]hat works” to “[w]hat keeps people straight” to
emphasize the priority of rehabilitation); Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and
the Meaning of Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291, 296 (2016) (describing probation oﬃcers as deterrents
rather than rehabilitators).
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expungement of a conviction—where the sentence has already been served—
or an arrest—where blameworthiness was never found as a matter of law.
Expungement presupposes that harm to the petitioner has already been
inﬂicted, either by virtue of an arrest or a conviction with a sentence. The
petitioner has suﬀered at the hands of the state already, either via the stigma
attached to the arrest or due to a sentence inﬂicted after a duly obtained
conviction. Having done the time, requiring the petitioner to prove why the
state should not keep inﬂicting harm through the maintenance of a public
criminal record in order to obtain expungement is puzzling. Doing so forces
petitioners to prove why they no longer deserve punishment, but it is the
state that must justify inﬂicting harm stemming from contact with the
system. That is the case for the arrestee without a conviction and the
convicted individual who has done his time.
As such, this Article suggests that the original theoretical bases behind
expungement regimes actually can stunt their eﬃcacy, meaning the
inspiration for expungement has limited its aspirations. Rehabilitative logic
supports expungement in theory, but in terms of details of administration, it
only can go so far. And we are seeing that unfold again in real-time, as
legislators argue over the public-safety implications of expungement regimes
and ask whether a particular measure will advance or limit public safety.
Public-safety rationales can only go so far to persuade, especially when the
fundamental lens through which the average constituent evaluates the
criminal justice system remains desert.24 And when policymakers and
decision-makers are still dialoguing about evolving privacy norms, the
combination of rehabilitative logic and concerns for privacy does not provide
solid ground for expanding expungement relief and making the process less
onerous. While a few states have trended towards automatic expungement for
a limited class of criminal records, widespread procedural reform across
jurisdictions requires a more robust theoretical footing.
In response to this critique, this Article proposes a new expungement
paradigm, focusing on the obligations and constraints of retributive justice.
Referring to this lens as “retributive expungement,” the Article argues desertbased expungement will place petitioners in a better position by requiring the
state to justify why continued punishment (by denying expungement, either
substantively or via procedural means) is appropriate. This perspective
supports a positive duty on the state to make eligible individuals aware of the
possibility of relief and can support presumptions for expungement and

24 See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflicts in Intuitions of Justice, 91
MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1892 (2007) (noting how lay intuitions about crime and punishment are mostly
ﬁxed in certain contexts).
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automatic expungement after set timelines. The key to reforming
expungement is to supplement its rehabilitative value with a dose of desert.
As such, this Article makes several contributions. First, it
comprehensively describes the theoretical origin of expungement,
demonstrating its rehabilitative and privacy-centric roots. It canvasses the
world of expungement procedure both then and now, identifying the degree
to which processes reﬂect these premises and inhibit expungement. This
interpretive story responds to Professors Sonja B. Starr and J.J. Prescott’s
study that found a signiﬁcant uptake gap in the rate at which expungement
was achieved. One contributing factor identiﬁed was the sets of procedures
underlying the remedy itself, and it is the aim of this Article is to zoom in on
those procedures and why they exist. In truth, they relate to the genesis of
expungement regimes: a serious, and well-intentioned concern for
rehabilitation and reentry to decrease recidivism. Procedure has remained
static for this reason. As such, Part II descriptively identiﬁes rehabilitative
and privacy-based expungement regimes dating back the 1950s and 60s, and
Part III demonstrates that the same paradigm still lives despite signiﬁcant
substantive reforms.
In addition to these descriptive and interpretive contributions, this
Article advances a normative claim: that injecting expungement regimes with
a dose of retributive principles can lead to a more favorable remedy, both in
substance and procedure. Retributive principles would shift the spotlight to
the state, focusing on the state’s responsibilities as punisher to not overpunish. It argues that retributive principles can support a presumption for
expungement, rebuttable only on a context-speciﬁc basis.
While many who support criminal justice reforms that help arrestees and
those who have been convicted are skeptical of retributivist models and favor a
rehabilitative approach, the retributivist approach has practical appeal given
that many states already maintain retributivist constraints on the coercive
power of the state in their sentencing regimes.25 It is politically viable because
desert dominates perceptions of the wisdom of criminal justice decisions
among prosecutors, judges, and the public. And it is mindful of the restorative
components underlying desert, proportionality, the associational, communal,
and state duties towards the punished, and the adverse effects of collateral
consequences and shaming on reentry. In fact, some states are already moving
in this direction, and their efforts can serve as a model for the rest of the
country. This lens supports reforms like automated expungement, which would
be more palatable if presented to the wider populace as an extension of desertbased principles not only justifying but limiting the state’s ability to punish.

25

See infra subsection IV.B.1.
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In short, for reformers to usher in a new era of expungement, connecting
with retributivism is worthwhile. This approach can trim procedural overgrowth
to supplement substantive expungement reforms that already recognize the
disproportionate effects of a criminal record. Retributive expungement can help
narrow the uptake gap that is currently preventing many who have contacted the
criminal justice system from getting the relief they deserve.
I. THE PUNITIVE EFFECT OF PUBLIC CRIMINAL RECORDS
Public criminal records are everywhere. The days of trekking to the
courthouse and requesting paper ﬁles are almost entirely a thing of the past.
Nearly a third of the adult population of the United States has information
about interactions with the criminal justice system available to the broader
public.26 This information exists online in multiple places, and state
governments sell the data to private companies27 to make money to subsidize
governmental budgets.
At times, the numbers can seem jaw-dropping. The FBI adds over ten
thousand names to its records each day alone.28 The number of documented
arrests is approaching three hundred million.29 This information exists
beyond FBI databases—multiple governmental agencies and hundreds of
private companies maintain these records.30 States maintain this information

26 MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, THE NAT’L EMP. L.
PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 1 (2011), https://www.nelp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf
[https://perma.cc/44QZ-GSH6]
(noting that over twenty-ﬁve percent of the adult population has a criminal record); Jo Craven
McGinty, How Many Americans Have a Police Record? Probably More Than You Think, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 7, 2015, 11:59 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-many-americans-have-a-police-recordprobably-more-than-you-think-1438939802 [https://perma.cc/B8UM-AG9X] (reporting that nearly
one-third of American adults has a police record); see also Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As
Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:30
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-ﬁnd-consequences-can-last-alifetime-1408415402 [https://perma.cc/QH8R-W9NS] (“America has a rap sheet.”).
27 See James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 387, 401 (2006) (“Some private information brokers obtain court records en masse.
Credit bureaus have always obtained information on individual criminal history from court
records.”); James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal
Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 180-81 (2008) (oﬀering a brief history of federal
involvement in state record keeping eﬀorts). Jacobs and Crepet also catalog how commercial vendors
purchase this information, in bulk, from state record repositories. Id. at 185–87.
28 Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 26.
29 Id.
30 Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 27, at 186 (“An internet search for ‘criminal records’ yields
dozens of companies oﬀering, for a modest fee, to carry out criminal background checks for
employment, housing, and other purposes. These companies are somewhat regulated by the federal
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).”).
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in electronic formats.31 Many know these items as “rap sheets.” They
catalogue experiences of individuals in the system, ranging from the moment
of booking and arrest to the results of post-conviction proceedings. The
ability to interpret this complicated data requires experience and, given that
the information can be incorrect, the presentation of an incomplete picture
can contribute to the overall stigma stemming from a public criminal record.32
This information has significant consequences for those attempting to
reenter society after contacting the criminal justice system.33 First, and perhaps
most importantly, the information can drive decisionmaking by non-state actors
when determining whether to give someone an opportunity. Employers are
entitled to use the information in numerous ways.34 Landlords can as well.35
State occupational licensing agencies can utilize the information to restrict the
ability to pursue a livelihood.36 Other public benefits or resources might be
diminished or made unavailable on the basis of the information.
Collateral consequences associated with a criminal record are severe and
pervasive.37 There are close to forty-ﬁve thousand on the books.38 They span
all three levels of government.39 Some are mandatory, preventing the use of
31 See Eisha Jain, Arrests As Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 839 (2015) (“Every state has a
criminal justice repository that maintains databases of ﬁngerprints and criminal records, including
the ﬁngerprints of certain public employees or licensees.”).
32 See, e.g., Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 26 (giving examples of the lingering impact of
arrest records, even when charges were ultimately dropped); Jacobs, supra note 27, at 400 (“[O]f
course, these instruments conﬁrm that a particular individual has faced or is facing particular
criminal charges, which may be all the information that the requester wants to know and all that is
necessary to negatively impact the individual’s current and future opportunities.”).
33 While this section surveys the types of criminal records that exist and the consequences that
can ﬂow from them, it is not meant to be comprehensive. Some of my previous work, as well as the
work of countless others, discusses this phenomenon in greater detail.
34 See e.g., 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 9125(b) (2020) (permitting usage of felony or misdemeanor
conviction information when making employment decisions).
35 See e.g., OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., GUIDANCE ON
APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS BY
PROVIDERS OF HOUSING AND REAL ESTATE-RELATED TRANSACTIONS (2016),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/HUD_OGCGUIDAPPFHASTANDCR.PDF
[https://perma.cc/88R7-P3WM] (describing how, absent a disparate impact or eﬀect on the basis of
a protected trait, unlawful discrimination on the basis of a criminal record is diﬃcult to prove).
36 See generally RODRIGUEZ & AVERY, supra note 26.
37 See generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECILIA KLINGELE,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE (2013).
38 Collateral Consequences Inventory, NAT’L INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
CONVICTION, https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/consequences (click “Search” with no
ﬁltering information) [https://perma.cc/WH6S-9MRQ] (last visited Dec. 10, 2020).
39 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13663 (prohibiting public housing for households with individuals
subject to lifetime sex oﬀender registration); WIS. STAT. § 6.03(1)(b) (2020) (establishing
disenfranchisement for persons convicted of treason, felony, or bribery); Standley v. Town of
Woodﬁn, 661 S.E.2d 728, 729 (N.C. 2008) (discussing a town ordinance that aﬀected movement of
registered sex oﬀenders within the municipality).
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discretion in concrete cases. Others are discretionary, allowing employers and
licensing agencies to evaluate eligibility case-by-case, but often without clear
guidance on what type of record should be prohibitive or not.
Further, arrest and conviction records both lead to these consequences.
For example, a non-conviction disposition can still aﬀect one’s deportation
status.40 Nearly sixty-ﬁve million adult Americans have an arrest record, with
minority groups representing a disproportionate share of the population.41
This is the result of mass criminalization, a system dominated by
misdemeanor arrests,42 and few post-arrest obstacles to formal charges.43
These arrests also are not the sort on the front pages of the local newspaper
or the evening news; as such, the records exist in the shadow of other criminal
justice processes, out of the eye of the average individual assessing the validity
of the system as a whole.44 As Eisha Jain has written, arrests are often used as
proxies during screening for jobs or other public beneﬁts and to regulate

See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (deﬁning “conviction” broadly).
Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
963, 964 (2013). By age twenty-three, “one out of every three adults can expect to be arrested . . . .”
Jain, supra note 31, at 817. For Black and Latino men, that statistic is closer to one in two. Id.
42 Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1804 n.78 (2012).
43 See Gary L. Anderson, The Preliminary Hearing—Better Alternatives or More of the Same, 35 MO.
L. REV. 281, 281-83 (1970) (proposing alternatives to the preliminary hearing to protect against baseless
charges); Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent
Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 468–69, 498 (1980) (“The pretrial process
requires only a minimal showing of factual guilt.”). See generally William Ortman, Probable Cause
Revisited, 68 STAN. L. REV. 511, 511 (2016) ([“[T]he probable cause standard exacerbates plea
bargaining’s innocence problem and its propensity for prosecutorial control of criminal justice.”).
44 As I have mentioned elsewhere, a common argument against expungement is that the
Internet age and pervasiveness of news outlets undercuts the utility of the remedy. See Murray, supra
note 17, at 2833 n.61. But so many charges never make it to those public places, yet remain in
databases searched and combed by employers and other actors, containing data coming from public
entities that are within the reach of expungement laws.
40
41
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behavior.45 For example, public housing authorities,46 Immigration Customs
and Enforcement (ICE),47 and employers all use arrest information.48
Conviction-based criminal records have even more eﬀect than arrest
records on individual opportunities, and also disproportionately impact
marginalized communities.49 Federal and state statutes expressly bar exoﬀenders from ﬁlling certain jobs.50 Convictions can result in ineligibility for
public beneﬁts, such as welfare, medical beneﬁts, and unemployment.51
Because many of these beneﬁts, and the ability to obtain a job,52 relate to
positive reentry, the eﬀect can be stark.

45 Jain, supra note 31, at 810 (“[A]ctors outside the criminal justice system, such as immigration
enforcement officials, public housing authorities, public benefits administrators, employers, licensing
authorities, social services providers, and education officials, among others . . . use arrest information
for their own purposes and in ways that are distinct from the aims of the criminal justice system.”).
46 Jain, supra note 31, at 833-38.
47 Secure
Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T,
http://web.archive.org/web/20140910121059/http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get-the-facts.htm
(last visited Sept. 10, 2014) (“Through April 30, 2014, more than 283,000 convicted criminal aliens were
removed from the United States after identification through Secure Communities.”); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-708, SECURE COMMUNITIES: CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVALS
INCREASED, BUT TECHNOLOGY PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED 14 (2012),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592415.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMH2-H795] (twenty percent of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement removals in 2010 and the early part of 2011 were linked to Secure
Communities). It is common for ICE to detain an individual upon learning of an arrest within the state
system. See Immigration Detainers, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/ice-andborder-patrol-abuses/immigration-detainers [https://perma.cc/QTB3-MF75] (“An ICE detainer is a
written request that a local jail or other law enforcement agency detain an individual for an additional 48
hours after his or her release date in order to provide ICE agents extra time to decide whether to take
the individual into federal custody for removal purposes.”).
48 See SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: CONDUCTING CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS (2010), http://www.slideshare.net/shrm/background-check-criminal
[https://perma.cc/X6BM-BHFY] (showing a majority of employers run criminal background checks
on interviews); Memorandum from Brian P. Ritchie, Acting Deputy Inspector Gen. for Evaluation
and Inspections, Off. of Inspector Gen., to Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicaid & Medicare
Servs. 1 (May 29, 2014), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-07-14-00131.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6MKRBSD] (showing that forty-one states require background checks on home health agency employees).
49 U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE CROSSROADS OF
PUNISHMENT, REDEMPTION, AND THE EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES 19 (2019),
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2019/06-13-Collateral-Consequences.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2FW-CH59].
50 See EMP. UNIT, CMTY. LEGAL SERVS. OF PHILA., LEGAL REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS:
EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS IN PENNSYLVANIA 6-11 (2019),
https://clsphila.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Legal-Remedies-and-Limitations-February2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM75-AZ5V] (noting how individuals with certain types of convictions
cannot seek employment at airports, banks, insurance companies, long-term care facilities, ride
sharing companies, and schools, even in certain security positions).
51 21 U.S.C. § 862a(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(4), (b)(3); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 802(g) (West 2018).
52 See Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, Recognizing Redemption: Old Criminal Records and
Employment Outcomes, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 273-74 (2018) (describing impacts on
employment outcomes); Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, The Eﬀectiveness of Certificates of
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Criminal records not only generate collateral consequences, they also have
a less tangible but nonetheless weighty stigmatizing eﬀect on ex-arrestees or
oﬀenders, and a communicative eﬀect on those made aware of the history.
Criminal records communicate negative interactions with the criminal law.
These records are quite readily available to the average consumer; accessing
paper records or a physical ﬁle is no longer necessary.53 Almost every state
has a publicly available Internet database of criminal records that are
accessible with the click of a few buttons and the entry of a name, address,
and other information. Results can list court summaries as well as provide
access to court dockets.
A cottage industry of sorts also exists; in the information age, it is not
diﬃcult set up websites or other data-sharing initiatives that proliferate and
enable the sharing of criminal record information.54 In the past two decades,
this has turned into a proﬁtable business55 with a sizeable market, considering
over ninety percent of employers report performing background checks on
some employees.56 That business reality, coupled with societal fascination
with the dirty laundry of others, has led to less elaborate, but extremely
pugnacious operations, like “Mugshot” websites.57 The industry prioritizes
quick checks58 at the risk of inaccurate reporting. Given that many of these
sites rely on state databases, and in fact purchase the information from such
databases at a bulk rate,59 errors at the source are particularly problematic.

Relief as Collateral Consequence Relief Mechanisms: An Experimental Study, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
INTER ALIA 11, 11 (2016).
53 Jacobs, supra note 27, at 387.
54 Id. at 388 (noting numerous private vendors).
55 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY
BACKGROUND CHECKS 2 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8LCF-YZBA] (noting that most private employers conduct background searches
through private enterprises or through commercial databases that aggregate criminal records).
56 SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT., supra note 48.
57 See David Segal, Mugged by a Mug Shot Online, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/mugged-by-a-mug-shot-online.html
[https://perma.cc/Z9YD-YK3Z] (describing the disruptive eﬀect just a picture on a mugshot website
can have on someone’s life).
58 See, e.g., Traﬃc, Criminal and Arrest Records Search, INSTANT CHECKMATE,
https://www.instantcheckmate.com/criminal-records [https://perma.cc/5RH8-9STN].
59 Jacobs, supra note 27, at 395.
[T]here are laws in every state mandating or authorizing the release of individual
criminal history records to certain non-criminal justice government agencies—
agencies charged with granting licenses to individuals and ﬁrms in diverse businesses,
ranging from liquor stores and bars to banks and private security ﬁrms as well as to
agencies that provide programs and services to vulnerable populations including
children, the elderly, and the handicapped.
Id.

678

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 665

In short, the combination of public criminal record history information
and collateral consequences has signiﬁcant eﬀects on the justice of
punishment that results by virtue of contact with the criminal justice system.
Public criminal records connect to penal purposes60 and can serve a legitimate
purpose. Collateral consequences are the same and can be just.61 Their
combination necessarily implicates punishment norms and therefore any
remedy must reconcile with theories of punishment. For the arrestee who was
never convicted, the information can punish without cause. For the convicted
person who completed her sentence, the information can perpetuate
undeserved punishment.
Expungement regimes oﬀer one means of mitigating these undesirable
outcomes. The next section undertakes a discussion of the theoretical roots
of public criminal records, before turning to the procedural realities on the
ground that characterize the current terrain of expungement relief.
II. THE ORIGINAL EXPUNGEMENT PARADIGM: PRIVACY AND
REHABILITATION
A. Criminal Recordkeeping and the Purposes of Punishment
From its origins to the present-day, the practice of keeping public criminal
records has always implicated theories of criminal punishment.62 Prior to
criminal recordkeeping by American jurisdictions, European countries began
collecting and storing criminal records in order to identify individuals who
reoﬀended.63 Criminal recordkeeping served utilitarian goals. Public-safety
rationales justiﬁed public recordkeeping: the records could be used to prevent
future crimes by conﬁrming those who needed to be controlled and by
reinforcing that violations of the criminal law undermined the shared social
ethos in a given community.64
Scholars have shown that by keeping criminal records, the state could
track and keep an eye on the most dangerous members of the community and
signal to the public the persistent shame that comes with violating the
60 See generally Alessandro Corda, More Justice and Less Harm: Reinventing Access to Criminal
History Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1, 8-15 (2016) (describing history and purposes behind public criminal
records databases). See infra Section II.A. (referencing the connection between punishment theory
and public criminal records databases).
61 Brian M. Murray, Are Collateral Consequences Deserved?, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1031, 1034
(2020) (hypothesizing that certain collateral consequences may be just punishment).
62 See generally Corda, supra note 60, at 8 (arguing that the origins and maintenance of criminal
conviction record systems have been closely connected to modern theories of recidivism).
63 JOHN PRATT, GOVERNING THE DANGEROUS: DANGEROUSNESS, LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 33-34 (1997).
64 Corda, supra note 60, at 10-11 (describing French adoption of penal registers in 1850).
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criminal law. Most concretely, public criminal records allowed the
government to identify those who should be incapacitated given persistent
recidivism.65 Alessandro Corda, in connecting punishment theory to public
criminal records data, has noted that public criminal records “amplify the
imposed punishment . . . [by] mak[ing] oﬀending less likely.”66 Public
criminal records were the logical outgrowth of deterrence and incapacitative
based theories underlying administration of the criminal law.67
But while the collection of criminal record information could be used
instrumentally, it could also function as an accessory to the punishment itself.
There is reason to believe that this was the reason such records were initially
made public. At the very least, Arnould Bonneville de Marsangy, a French
penal reformer, conceived things that way. Bonneville thought that the public
nature of such records would increase surveillance and ratchet up stigma for
the convicted, increasing overall deterrence.68
In fairness, the American historical picture seems to be steeped more in a
desire for accuracy than a desire to achieve any particular penal objectives.69
This makes sense given that recordkeeping occurred in a political and legal
space that prioritizes transparency and permits public reporting of
proceedings in the criminal justice system.70 Centralization of public criminal
records is a relatively recent phenomenon.
Today, the state, in addition to tracking its own activity when enforcing
the criminal law, also makes the records available for free and by sale, for the
65 PRATT, supra note 63, at 33-34; see also 5 LEON RADZINOWICZ & ROGER HOOD, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 261-62 (1986)
(“The only tangible success to emerge from the legislation on habitual criminals was the system of
registration and identiﬁcation.”).
66 Corda, supra note 60, at 11 (citing ARNOULD BONNEVILLE DE MARSANGY, EXPOSE
COMPLET DU SYSTEME DES CASIERS JUDICIARES (1848)).
67 Brian M. Murray, Retributivist Reform of Collateral Consequences, 52 CONN. L. REV. 863, 911
(2020) (“These public registries heightened the state’s capacity for surveillance, allowing for
partnership with private members of the community.”) (citing Corda, supra note 60, at 11 (“[Penal
registries] were not meant simply to be an eﬀective technical support for implementation of habitual
oﬀender laws. Two further goals were intended: encouraging mutual surveillance within
communities and heightening the stigma of conviction in a way that would amplify the imposed
punishment and make future oﬀending less likely.”)).
68 Corda, supra note 60, at 11 (citing DE MARSANGY, supra note 66).
69 See, e.g., Corda, supra note 60, at 41 (citing SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF
POLICE REFORM: THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM 40 (1977)) (arguing that the original
aims of criminal history information were to facilitate the identiﬁcation of suspects and defendants
as well as enhancing the legitimacy of police forces).
70 See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 609 (1982) (emphasizing the
importance of the press and public to gain access to criminal trials); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-73 (1980) (discussing that publicity and openness are important to the
functioning of a trial); United States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705, 708 (10th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging
the right “to inspect and copy judicial records. . . . [which] preserv[es] the integrity of the law
enforcement and judicial processes.”).
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very purposes found early on in Continental Europe. These online databases
are accessible to almost anyone, enabling state and private actors to do
precisely the same public-safety-based line drawing initially conceived of by
Continental actors. This, of course, is why the federal government has sought
to interface with these online databases.71 Uniform accuracy assists law
enforcement in its pursuit of public safety by allowing for easy identiﬁcation
of those who are dangerous.72 It also allows private actors to cooperate in
pursuing the same objectives, a result that employment law and other private
law supports.73 Further, even where expungement regimes exist, they can
maintain exceptions for usage by law enforcement, thereby reaﬃrming that a
primary purpose of criminal recordkeeping is to further assist law
enforcement in its public safety objectives.
Public criminal records thus have eﬀects that implicate the degree and
severity of the punishment felt by those who have convictions.74 This can be
visible or invisible; digital records that link to court data are particularly
troublesome. They operate to condemn in an ongoing fashion, and
condemnation is the material of punishment in the American system.75 As
Corda has put it, “[c]riminal history information leaves marks . . . that
pervade and aﬀect crucial aspects of . . . lives long after the imposed sentence
has been served.”76 While formalist deﬁnitions preclude their classiﬁcation as
“criminal punishment” under existing doctrine, criminal records connect to
punitive consequences.77 At the very least, they “amplify punishment beyond

71 Corda, supra note 60, at 13 (describing the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Act
as instrumental to the development of the U.S. criminal record infrastructure that exists today).
72 See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 444-46 (2013) (describing how CODIS, amongst
other databases, assists law enforcement to identify individuals within the system).
73 See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 39 CARD. L. REV. 2265, 2269 (2018)
(arguing that employers, operating as private actors, extend the public function of criminal
punishment when rejecting job applicants with criminal records and discharging employees based
on non-workplace misconduct; this reality raises concerns about the structural ﬂaws with the
criminal system and the legal status of employment).
74 Radice, supra note 21, at 1342 (“[T]he conviction on their public record becomes the most
signiﬁcant part of the criminal punishment because the criminal record can last a lifetime . . . .”).
75 See Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1485, 1541 (2016) (“The condemnation function is what makes criminal law distinctive;
indeed condemnatory punishment is what U.S. courts use to distinguish criminal and civil law in
ambiguous cases.”). Kleinfeld cites Kansas v. Hendricks, which holds that involuntary commitment
is not punishment because it is civil and lacks either retributive or deterrent objectives. 521 U.S. 346,
361-62 (1997).
76 Corda, supra note 60, at 6.
77 See Murray, supra note 61, at 1047 (discussing how collateral consequences can be
characterized as punitive even if they are not formally characterized as criminal “punishment”).
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the sanctions imposed by the criminal justice system.”78 Further, they furnish
stigma that is essentially an informal mode of punishment.79
B. Early Expungement Regimes: Privacy and Rehabilitation
Expungement remedies rose to prominence during the era when the
rehabilitative mindset pervaded the criminal justice system,80 making them a
natural response to recordkeeping practices that, without expungement
available, would not always manage to distinguish between dangerous and nondangerous members of the ex-offender population. Policymakers, scholars, and
decisionmakers in the system conceived expungement within a rehabilitative
sentencing paradigm mindful of broader utilitarian goals for punishment.81
Juvenile oﬀenders were the ﬁrst eligible group because their rehabilitation
was thought possible.82 Expungement had a twofold purpose: incentivizing
rehabilitation by promising a second chance and helping the already
rehabilitated reenter their communities by removing otherwise existing
barriers.83 The idea was that the rehabilitated could continue to build on the
new identity they had begun to forge during the completion of their direct
sentence.84 Notice the corollary to that statement: maintaining a criminal
record was no longer useful or necessary for public safety or accuracy
purposes because the person was no longer a risk.85 Expungement
simultaneously aﬃrmed and assisted rehabilitation, thereby allowing the
78 Megan C. Kurlychek, Robert Brame & Shawn D. Bushway, Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does
An Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 483, 484 (2006).
79 See Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1104-05 (2013)
(arguing that informal consequences of convictions, including the negative social, economic, medical,
and psychological consequences of a conviction, entrench the stigmatizing features of punishment).
80 Radice, supra note 21, at 1326 (“During the 1960s and 1970s, states endorsed a rehabilitative
ideal as an integral part of the criminal justice system.”).
81 See, e.g., Peter D. Pettler & Dale Hilmen, Comment, Criminal Records of Arrest and Conviction:
Expungement from the General Public Access, 3 CAL. W. L. REV. 121, 124 (1967) (arguing that
expungement’s primary objective is to mitigate the penalties public opinion, as opposed to the law,
imposes upon one convicted of an offense against society); Isabel Brawer Stark, Comment, Expungement
and Sealing of Arrest and Conviction Records: The New Jersey Response, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 864, 865
(1974) (referencing the broader context of “rehabilitative ideal” for the criminal justice system).
82 Fred C. Zacharias, The Uses and Abuses of Convictions Set Aside Under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act, 1981 DUKE L.J. 477, 481-84 (discussing juvenile expungement measures as responses
to the desire to rehabilitate youth oﬀenders).
83 See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 113-14 (2015) (“The purpose
of this policy . . . is to encourage rehabilitation and to recognize that a previously convicted oﬀender
has succeeded in turning his life around.”).
84 See, e.g., State v. N.W., 747 A.2d 819, 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (discussing how
the purpose of the expungement statute was to provide an oﬀender with a “second chance”).
85 WAYNE LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY
NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 83-84 (2009) (describing criminal history information as a way
to control dangerous bodies).
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individual to reenter the regular community, while allowing the government
to pursue other utilitarian-minded criminal law objectives.86
Expungement was designed to reward the rehabilitated and have a
rehabilitative eﬀect by restoring the individual’s “status quo ante.”87 It
recognized the positive steps already taken by the individual and helped to
clear future obstacles along that positive path.88 By helping to restore rights
and remove barriers to employment or beneﬁts, expungement increased the
chances of participation in activities that decreased the odds of recidivism.89
This rehabilitative logic manifested itself in the initial expungement
regimes that were created. They emphasized scrutiny of the condition and
character of the petitioner when assessing whether expungement was
appropriate.90 The goal was to determine whether the person and the person’s
86 See Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of
the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1716 (2003) (“Permanent changes in a criminal
oﬀender’s legal status serve[] to emphasize his ‘other-ness.’”).
87 Doe v. Utah Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 782 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1989); see also Michael D.
Mayﬁeld, Comment, Revisiting Expungement: Concealing Information in the Information Age, 1997
UTAH L. REV. 1057, 1057 (“In an attempt to alleviate the eﬀects of such ostracism, and to help
oﬀenders reenter society, federal and state governments created expungement laws designed to
conceal criminal records from the public.”) (internal citations omitted).
88 See Aidan R. Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Oﬀenders:
A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 162 (noting how expungement gives youth oﬀenders
“an incentive to reform” by “removing the infamy of [their] social standing”); Love, supra note 86,
at 1710 (“The purpose of judicial expungement or set-aside was to both encourage and reward
rehabilitation, by restoring social status as well as legal rights.”); Zacharias, supra note 82, at 483-84
(referencing the intent that, with a rehabilitation program, “a once-convicted youth would be free
to become a productive member of society because [they] would be free of any stigma from [their]
criminal conviction.”); Mayﬁeld, supra note 87, at 1063 (“Expungement, then, may be conceptualized
as a natural step in rehabilitation that allows an oﬀender to become suﬃciently reformed through
reintegration into society.”).
89 See J.J. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, The Power of a Clean Slate, REGULATION: THE CATO REVIEW
OF
BUSINESS
AND
GOVERNMENT,
Summer
2020,
at
28,
29,
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/ﬁles/2020-06/regulation-v43n2-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3WSPHUW] (studying evidence in Michigan and ﬁnding that expungement recipients have very low
rates of recidivism and demonstrate better employment outcomes.); see also Mayﬁeld, supra note 87,
at 1062 (“The underlying philosophy of expungement has always been to rehabilitate prisoners by
providing ‘an accessible or eﬀective means of restoring social status.’”) (quoting Steven K. O’Hern,
Note, Expungement: Lies That Can Hurt You in and out of Court, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 574, 576 (1988)).
Mayﬁeld describes how expungement arguably has roots in utilitarian punishment theory and
particularly rehabilitation theory. Id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,
CRIMINAL LAW 24 (2d ed. 1986)).
90 See Stephens v. Toomey, 338 P.2d 182, 187-88 (Cal. 1959) (holding that because the petitioner
was under probation and thus the criminal proceeding was still outstanding against him, he was not
eligible for the expungement he sought); People v. Johnson, 285 P.2d 74, 76 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955)
(finding that the expungement statute did not allow the trial court to consider subsequent criminal
episodes when determining whether or not the defendant qualified for an expungement for a
particular crime in which he successfully completed probation and reasoning that a person who had a
satisfactory background and committed a crime but complied with probation measures completed the
reformation processes needed for that particular offense and could be granted an expungement);
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criminal record were no longer one and the same, such that grouping the
petitioner in with the category of individuals who needed monitoring was no
longer appropriate.91 Proof of fewer or no run-ins with the law, a positive
attitude, problem-free time in jail, other noteworthy activities, and the ability
to complete the expungement process itself,92 were signals that someone had
been rehabilitated.93 Expungement, as a unique and narrow remedy, was
restricted to the few who had proven themselves worthy of reconsideration.
Placing the burden on the petitioner to prove that she was rehabilitated made
total sense in this regard.
The earliest judicial decisions entertaining the idea of expunging or
sealing criminal records operated from these premises. Judges were
frequently in the business of hearing from prisoners, probationers, and others
who claimed to be rehabilitated.94 Arrestees (who did not need to prove
rehabilitation, but certainly good character) and extremely low-level
oﬀenders (once rehabilitation was proven) began to petition courts in the
name of privacy. Courts treaded cautiously, repeatedly denying
expungements,95 and awarding them only after they were convinced of the
People v. Mojado, 70 P.2d 1015, 1016-17 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937) (discussing that although the
defendant received an expungement for an offense, a prior conviction could be proved in a subsequent
prosecution and would have to be given the same effect as if the former accusation had not been
expunged). It is important to keep in mind that expungement’s link to rehabilitation was not the only
possible route. Early cases also judged expungement through a privacy lens. See, e.g., Menard v.
Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (discussing that public information stemming from
an arrest poses potential injuries to a person’s reputation and limits a person’s opportunities for
schooling, employment, or professional licenses even if they are exonerated. Further, the court
recounted how unlawful arrests lead to harassment of “hippies” and civil rights workers); Eddy v.
Moore, 487 P.2d 211, 217 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that a person who has been acquitted has a
right to privacy to the fingerprints officers have taken and photographs of the accused).
91 See Pettler & Hilmen, supra note 81, at 124 (“This being so, it is only natural and just that he
is deemed ﬁt to return to his former role in society and assume a position of equality with its
members.”). Early cases followed the same logic. See generally Stephens, 338 P.2d at 188; Johnson, 285
P.2d at 76; Mojado, 70 P.2d at 1016-17.
92 See Jon Geﬀen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the Past: An Overview of Criminal Expungement
Law in Minnesota—State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1344 (2005) (noting that
statutory procedures in Minnesota were “intentionally created to be somewhat cumbersome to help
protect the presumption that criminal records remain publicly available”).
93 JACOBS, supra note 83, at 114 (“After a certain period of crime-free behavior, the ex-oﬀender
has demonstrated that he has put his past oﬀending behind him and deserves reinstatement as a
citizen in good standing.”).
94 In 1977, the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that expungement was an equitable
remedy under the state constitution. Minnesota v. R.L.F. (In re R.L.F.), 256 N.W.2d 803, 807-08
(Minn. 1977). Four years later, it legitimized trial court expungement. State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d
353, 357 (Minn. 1981) (“The statute . . . which provides for the return of some criminal records,
could be considered to be a kind of ‘expungement.’”).
95 See, e.g., Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 So. 2d 132, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (arguing there is no
right to judicial expungement); In re Peabody v. Francke, 168 N.Y.S.2d 201, 202 (App. Div. 1957)
(showing no right to expungement exists in the wake of a reversed conviction and subsequent
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petitioner’s worthiness. Frankly, early courts struggled with a theory of
expungement, ranging from prioritizing privacy96 considerations (and
thereby the petitioner), to a middle ground that focused on rehabilitation,
which allowed for simultaneous balancing of state public safety interests with
petitioner-centric concerns.97 They essentially set up a de facto two step
inquiry built on rehabilitative logic and privacy concerns: ﬁrst, a petitioner
had to prove he was not a risk; second, if the answer was that he was not, the
petitioner needed to show that the maintenance of the criminal record by a
governmental agency violated privacy interests so much that the harm to the
individual outweighed public safety concerns. Expungement, therefore,
became primarily utilitarian.
State legislatures, when codifying expungement regimes, borrowed from
these premises.98 First, expungement was only available to a select minority
of prior oﬀenders, and usually only to arrestees without a negative
disposition.99 Having a narrow range of eligible petitioners allowed the state
to maintain its ability to pursue public safety goals through the maintenance
of a criminal records database.100 Additionally, arrestees who were not
convicted seemingly had the strongest privacy interest to counterbalance
public safety concerns held by the state. Some early statutes had
expungement of a conviction take the form of dismissal of the charges after
completion of a period of probation or parole.101 Both situations represent
ﬁrm grounds for the idea that the person was not in need of rehabilitation.
dismissal), cert. denied sub nom. Peabody v. Gulotta, 357 U.S. 941 (1958). See Stark, supra note 81, at
870 n. 28 (detailing federal and state cases reluctant to extend expungement remedy without
legislative guidance).
96 See, e.g., Menard, 430 F.2d at 494; Eddy, 487 P.2d at 217.
97 See Robin Pulich, The Rights of the Innocent Arrestee: Sealing of Records Under California Penal
Code Section 851.8, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1463, 1472 (1977) (describing how early cases had varying
approaches to granting or denying expungement).
98 See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1203-1203.13 (Deering 1949) (setting a high bar and narrow
path for expungement); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:164-28 (1951) (same).
99 See Joseph C. Dugan, I Did My Time: The Transformation of Indiana’s Expungement Law, 90
IND. L.J. 1321, 1335 (2015) (“[I]ndividuals could petition for expungement if they were arrested and
released without charge or if the charges ﬁled against them were dropped due to mistaken identity,
no oﬀense in fact, or absence of probable cause.”); see also LOVE ET AL., supra note 37, at 113-24
(surveying judicial post-conviction remedies, including expungement). For example, as of 2006,
Wisconsin only allowed expungement of misdemeanor convictions if they occurred before age
twenty-one. Id. at 124.
100 See, e.g., Whittle v. Munshower, 155 A.2d 670, 670 (Md. 1959) (“[I]n the absence of statutory
requirement, police records are conﬁdential.”); People v. Pearson, 244 P.2d 35, 35 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1952) (referencing the idea that police records are conﬁdential and necessary for public safety);
Runyon v. Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 79 P.2d 101, 101 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938) (same).
101 See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 26-1234 (1940); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953)
(expungement after time since oﬀense); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 10-1803 (1945) (same); CAL. PEN.
CODE § 1203.4 (Deering 1957) (same); IDAHO CODE § 19-2604 (1965) (same), NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 176.340 (1963) (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.240 (1957) (same).

2021]

Retributive Expungement

685

The considerations in the early statutes or judge-made remedies
suggested a connection to rehabilitative based logic when determining
whether expungement was appropriate. In truth, some considerations—like
the nature and gravity of the oﬀense—were not strictly utilitarian in concern.
But others, such as the damage that the petitioner has endured, the stigmatic
eﬀect of criminal record, the activities of the petitioner in spheres of life
traditionally considered the domain of the productive (work, recreation,
family, etc.), led to balancing interests. Legislatures either directed courts, or
courts directed themselves to basically make determinations about the
petitioner’s future riskiness by scrutinizing whether the petitioner had
evidence of already achieved rehabilitation or that the expungement was
necessary to complete that process.102
These assessments usually entailed judging the moral character of the
petitioner to see if rehabilitation had occurred. For example, in California,
misdemeanors could be expunged upon a showing of “good moral
character.”103 The statute only allowed expungement as a reward for proving
rehabilitation.104 Interestingly, an early commentator asked if this made any
sense, expressing doubt as to whether it was rational to condition
expungement on a showing of good behavior while on probation.105
Similarly, in New Jersey, the right to expungement, and the ability to
apply to licensing bodies or for certain jobs was conditional on the applicant
showing a “degree of rehabilitation.”106 This seems to be the precise goal of
the Rehabilitated Convicted Oﬀenders Act, passed by the New Jersey
legislature in 1968.107 Its stated purpose was to “assist rehabilitated convicted
oﬀenders to obtain gainful employment, by the elimination of impediments
and restrictions . . . based solely upon the existence of a criminal record.”108

102 See, e.g., Meinken v. Burgess, 426 S.E.2d 876, 879 (Ga. 1993) (weighing a variety of factors
when considering expungement); Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981) (same);
Murray, supra note 67, at 913 (“In eﬀect, courts were tasked with engaging in cost-beneﬁt calculations
about oﬀender riskiness rather than contemplating whether the individual actually deserved to have
a public criminal record after serving the initial sentence.”); Walter W. Steele, Jr., A Suggested
Legislative Device for Dealing with Abuses of Criminal Records, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 32, 53-54
(1973) (referencing, in model statute, how waiting period conveyed rehabilitation).
103 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4a.
104 See id.
105 See Pettler & Hilmen, supra note 81, at 128. (“If the law is to be used to combat the practical
inequalities confronting one who has been convicted and paid his debt to society, what rational basis
exists to make the right of expungement dependent upon probation?”).
106 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:168A-2 to 2A:168A-3 (1971); see Stark, supra note 81, at 885 (“This
right is conditioned on the applicant having demonstrated a degree of rehabilitation which would
indicate that engagement in the licensed profession or business would not be incompatible with the
welfare of society or the aims and objectives of the licensing authority.”) (citations omitted).
107 Act of Sept. 4, 1968, ch. 282, 1968 N.J. Laws 828-29.
108 Id. at 829.
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This was because allowing the rehabilitated to work did not interfere with
“the welfare of society or the aims and objectives of the licensing authority.”109
As one commentator said at the time, the ability of an ex-oﬀender to seek
licensing was contingent upon the standard of rehabilitation assumed by the
expungement statute.110
Rehabilitative logic also presented itself in the procedures underlying the
ﬁrst-created expungement remedies. As one set of commentators noted,
expungement procedures seemed like they were designed to be
cumbersome.111 Onerous procedures simultaneously allowed the state to
pursue its goal of maintaining most of its criminal records while providing
hope for those who took rehabilitation seriously. The ability to jump through
the various hoops that were preconditions to expungement evidenced
rehabilitation because it conveyed resilience and compliance with the rule of
law, traits that were previously doubted given the petitioner’s prior run-in
with the law.
What were these procedures? As alluded to above, they included ﬁling
fees, deadlines, signiﬁcant amounts of paperwork, and the ability to
coordinate with state agencies when preparing technically sound petitions.112
These procedures also constructively required patience, attention to detail,
and the ability to articulate one’s cause for expungement in a persuasive
fashion. These traits were emblematic of the law-abiding and, therefore,
evidence of rehabilitation.
Automatic expungement regimes were not the norm. In New Jersey,
petitioners had to ﬁle, serve notice on prosecutors and courts involved in the
creation of the criminal record, and appear before the court.113 Other states
had similar pre-petition and pre-hearing procedures. Maryland required a
formal petition with written notice to law enforcement, leaving time for
investigation.114 Hearings were required for dismissed, nolle prossed, or
acquitted charges. In New Jersey, an objection by a prosecutor or law
enforcement prevented expungement and reduced the only available relief to
sealing.115 That held even if the court found the petition worthy of
expungement.116 In Minnesota, eligibility was determined by the number of
Id.
See Stark, supra note 81, at 885.
See Geﬀen & Letze, supra note 92, at 1344.
See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 610.123 (2005) (identifying causes of action for expungement
and relevant procedures); MD. CODE ANN. § 27-736 (1992) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.255
(1973) (same).
113 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:169-1 (1971) (repealed 1978).
114 MD. CODE ANN. § 27-736 (1992).
115 Act of June 28, 1973, ch. 191, 1973 N.J. Laws 609, 610 (codifed at N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 2A:85-17 to -18) (repealed 1979).
116 Id.
109
110
111
112
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years that the person was free of additional run-ins with the law.117 Certain
crimes were excluded from relief.118 For some drug-related oﬀenses, New
Jersey speciﬁcally required no additional criminal activity.119 For eligible
oﬀenses, completion of the statutory period allowed oﬃcial recognition of
rehabilitation.120 But even if the petitioner met these hurdles, the statute did
not guarantee relief: a judge merely had discretion to grant relief.121
Judicial discretion in these states required consideration of whether
additional behavior by the petitioner since creation of the old criminal record
either conﬁrmed or undermined a pattern of criminal behavior.122 In other
words, the judge’s decision depended on whether the petitioner could
demonstrate rehabilitation by proving a behavioral change.123 And that was
only the ﬁrst hurdle, as a balancing of state and petitioner interests came next,
resembling the precise theoretical construct identiﬁed above. And the law
placed the burden of persuasion squarely on the petitioner, even if the
criminal record only involved an arrest, and shockingly, sometimes if it
involved an acquittal.124
For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was candid about the
rehabilitative premises underlying expungement, and how its standard for
assessing expungement petitions was entirely a matter of balancing individual
and state interests.125 Lower courts were tasked with assessing the strength of
the case against the petitioner (e.g., how bad was the petitioner and light of
the charged criminal act) versus the harm “attendant to maintenance of the
arrest record.”126 Similarly, Minnesota reserved the expungement of some
low-level convictions for situations where there were no signiﬁcant public
safety concerns.127
117 See Geﬀen & Letze, supra note 92, at 1349, 1349 n.92 (citing MINN. STAT. § 299C.11(b)
(2004)) (referencing waiting periods without additional criminal activity).
118 Id. (referencing several felonies and other high misdemeanors).
119 1973 N.J. Laws 609, 610.
120 See Stark, supra note 81, at 894 (“The end of the statutory period marks the point at which
an individual receives oﬃcial recognition of his rehabilitation.”).
121 See id. at 888 (“[T]he decision to expunge is at the discretion of the court.”).
122 See Stark, supra note 81, at 888 (explaining that an old criminal record can be demonstrative
of a pattern of criminal behavior).
123 Id. at 894.
124 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 2A:85-15-17a; cf. Commonwealth v. D.M., 695 A.2d 770, 773 (Pa. 1997)
(granting automatic expungement of charges resulting in acquittal).
125 See Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981) (“In determining whether justice
requires expungement, the Court, in each particular case, must balance the individual’s right to be
free from the harm attendant to maintenance of the arrest record against the Commonwealth’s
interest in preserving such records.”).
126 Id.
127 See MINN. STAT. §§ 609A.02-609A.03 (2019) (“[T]he court shall grant the petition to seal
the record unless . . . the interests of the public and public safety outweigh the disadvantages to the
petitioner of not sealing the record.”); State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1981) (citing state

688

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 665

In short, regimes limited eligibility to the presumptively rehabilitated and
required additional showings relating to privacy and public safety interests.
III. THE PRESENT EXPUNGEMENT PARADIGM: PRIVACY AND
REHABILITATION AGAIN
A. The Promise of Expungement Reform
The past decade has seen extensive news coverage of the proliferation of
public criminal records and their negative eﬀects.128 States are experimenting
with diﬀerent types of substantive relief. As the Collateral Consequences
Resource Center noted in January 2019, these states “pursued a dizzying
variety of approaches, reducing waiting periods and expanding eligibility,
including for misdemeanors and some low-level felonies, and expediting
relief for non-conviction and juvenile records.”129 This Section will brieﬂy
summarize some of these substantive reforms before discussing how
expungement procedure lags behind.130
Expungement reforms vary across jurisdictions. In total, more than twothirds of states now permit expungement of convictions. Most of these states
permit relief for misdemeanor and felony convictions. Some states have
broadened eligibility in terms of the class of offenses that might be sealed or
expunged, starting with misdemeanors before moving to felonies. For example,
Maryland began by making certain non-violent misdemeanor offenses
eligible131 before extending relief to some felony offenses, without requiring a

statute that empowers the court to order expungement in cases where said statute provide). For a
discussion of Minnesota’s original regime, see Geﬀen & Letze, supra note 92.
128 See, e.g., J.J. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, The Case for Expunging Criminal Records, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/20/opinion/expunge-criminal-records.html [https://perma.cc/9GHHB6YZ] (describing criminal records as “major barriers to employment, housing, and education”; Beth LeBlanc,
Expungement Reform Clears Michigan House with Bipartisan Support, DETROIT NEWS,
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2019/11/05/expungement-reform-clears-michigan-housebipartisan-support/4169368002/ [https://perma.cc/7CH2-5S3U] (describing expungement as the return of
offenders’ full citizenship offerings).
129 MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR.,
REDUCING BARRIERS TO REINTEGRATION: FAIR CHANCE AND EXPUNGEMENT REFORMS IN 2018
(2019), https://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Fair-chance-and-expungement-reforms-in2018-CCRC-Jan-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AK5-F2TH].
130 Given that the main argument of this paper relates to expungement procedure, rather than
the substance of expungement reform, I decided not to devote extensive space to detailing all of the
changes that have occurred in various jurisdictions. For a detailed discussion, see id.
131 Maryland Second Chance Act of 2015, ch. 313, 2015 Md. Laws 1682, 1684-85 (codiﬁed at
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 10-301(f)(1)–(12)) (West 2020) (listing “shieldable convictions,”
including but not limited to disorderly conduct, possession of a controlled dangerous substance,
possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, and driving without a license).
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pardon from the Governor.132 Other states have similar statutes.133 Still other
states enabled victims of human trafficking to expunge convictions.134
Despite momentum towards broadening eligibility, there is great
variation amongst states regarding which types of oﬀenses are eligible.
Illinois is at the most generous end of the spectrum—extending relief to all
but a few very serious felonies.135 California, on the other hand, limits
expungement to extremely low-level drug-oﬀenses.136 A host of states are
somewhere in between, allowing expungement for many misdemeanors and
some felonies. The line for most states seems to be precluding expungement
for certain violent felonies or sex-based oﬀenses or, at the very least, attaching
signiﬁcantly longer waiting periods for those crimes.137
Generally speaking, states determine oﬀense-eligibility by judging the
seriousness of the oﬀense, prior criminal record information, and how much
time has passed since the oﬀense occurred.138 These considerations inform
the when and how of expungement.139 For instance, New York allows
expungement for nearly all felonies, but only if the conviction is the
petitioner’s only serious oﬀense.140 Indiana does something similar, but the
Id. § 10-301(e).
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1401 et seq. (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-706
(2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4374 (2020); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/5.2 (2020); IND. CODE
§ 35-38-9-2 et seq. (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6614 (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.073 (West
2020); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 978 A(2) (2020); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-110 (West
2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621 (2020); MINN.
STAT. §§ 609A.02 (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-71 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 610.140(2-5)
(2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.245 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:52-2 (2020); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 160.59 (Consol. 2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-145.5 (2020); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1 3202(9) (2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.31 et seq. (LexisNexis 2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 18(A)(12)-(13) (2020); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225 (2019); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-1.3-1 et seq.
(2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-920 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(g), (k) (2020); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 77-40-103 et seq. (LexisNexis 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 7601 et seq. (2020);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.640 (2020); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-26 (2020); WIS. STAT. § 973.015;
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-13-1501 to -1502 (2020).
134 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-909(E)-(F) (2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1412 (2020).
135 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2630/5.2 (2020) (detailing exceptions to expungement for
crimes against the Stalking No Contact Order Act, the Humane Care for Animals Act, and oﬀenses
that would require registration as a sex oﬀender).
136 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.45(a) (West 2020).
137 Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-13-1501 to -1502 (2020) (prohibiting expungement for,
among others, violent felonies), with WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.640 (2020) (prohibiting
expungement for Class B felonies occurring in the last ten years).
138 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-2(d) (2020) (describing the requirements for a petition
to expunge conviction records). See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.02 (2019) (excluding
expungement for certain felonies and setting an elapsed time period requirement).
139 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-2(b) (2020) (describing crimes the statute does not
apply to); see also id. § 35-38-9-2(d)(4) (outlining the requirements for expungement of a petitioner’s
records).
140 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.59 (Consol. 2020).
132
133
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limited public access that petitioners desire really only extends to lower-level
misdemeanor oﬀenses.141 North Carolina and Kentucky have a somewhat
more moderate approach, allowing nonviolent, but relatively serious
misdemeanor and felonies to be expunged, but only for individuals without
prior felony records.142 Similar gradated statutory regimes exist in Ohio,143
Michigan,144 Rhode Island,145 and Tennessee.146
These statutes now represent a new expungement norm, where relief is not
reserved just for nonconviction and acquittal charges. Expanded relief came at
the same time as statutory reforms limiting the dissemination of any preserved
information, and reforms that authorized petitioners to answer questions about
their prior convictions in a way that would not damage their ability to obtain
licenses or employment.147 As such, the promise of these statutes is great,
providing hope and setting expectations for ex-offenders seeking reentry. But
like most legislative reforms, the devil is in the details. Although the types of
offenses that are now eligible has generally broadened, states have linked
eligibility with other hurdles. For example, Maryland,148 Minnesota,149 and
Oregon150 itemize the types of offenses that are eligible, drawing clear lines
between those offenses that allow for second chances and those that are too
risky to do so. Further, states attach additional conditions like waiting periods
and nonrecidivism requirements on the promises made by the statutes.
While substantive expungement reform has occurred, the eﬀect of such
changes on access to expungement remains to be seen. The persistence of
procedural hurdles—the topic of the next Section—conﬁrms that
rehabilitation and public safety concerns remain the dominant paradigm for
expunging public criminal records.

141 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-6(a)(1) (2020); see also Dugan, supra note 99, at 1341–42,
nn.129–37 (citing the Indiana statute).
142 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-145.5 (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.078 (West 2020).
143 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.31 et seq. (LexisNexis 2020).
144 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621(1)-(3) (2020).
145 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-1.3-1(2) to -1(3) (2020).
146 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(g), (k) (2020).
147 Murray, supra note 8, at 371-73.
148 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 10-301(f)(1)–(12) (West 2020).
149 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.02 (2019).
150 OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225(5)-(8), (12) (2019)
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B. Modern-Day Procedure: Rehabilitation Prioritized Again
1. Pre-hearing Procedure: Determining Who is Worth the Risk
a. The Filing Paperwork.
The formal requirements for ﬁling and pursuing an expungement are
costly and time-consuming for potential petitioners and likely deter access to
relief.151 These requirements, to name a few, include: gathering and
completing several court forms, many of which are not self-explanatory;
acquiring ﬁngerprints or other identiﬁcation information from state and local
agencies; and compiling police and court records. These pre-ﬁling formal
requirements often require signiﬁcant sophistication on the part of the
individual pursuing the expungement.152 In eﬀect, they assume that those
individuals who have been reformed suﬃciently will be able and determined
to navigate the process. But as Prescott and Starr have stated, “when criminal
justice relief mechanisms require individuals to go through application
procedures, many people who might beneﬁt from them will not do so.”153
While by no means exhaustive, a few examples from counties across the
country show the nature of these restraints on access. A petitioner in Chester
County, Pennsylvania, upon viewing the county’s website,154 will learn that
there are several steps to begin the process. The petitioner must prepare a
petition and order accurately or face “rejection of petition.”155 In some
jurisdictions, a rejected petition results in a time bar before another one can

151 See Prescott & Starr, supra note 10, at 2466 n.24 (noting how the Michigan State police
suggested low expungement rates existed due to failures to apply). For a greater discussion of how
onerous procedures limit access to justice, see id. at 2502-04. Cf. Maximilian A. Bulinski & J.J.
Prescott, Online Case Resolution Systems: Enhancing Access, Fairness, Accuracy, and Eﬃciency, 21 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 205, 217-18 (2016) (discussing how online case resolution mechanisms may increase
access to justice by reducing cost and diﬃculty barriers); J.J. Prescott, Assessing Access-to-Justice
Outreach Strategies, 174 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 34, 38 (2018) (explaining that most lawsuits
in state courts involve a series of common physical, psychological, and ﬁnancial barriers that limit
access to justice).
152 See Prescott & Starr, supra note 10, at 2503-04.

[P]eople with records are usually struggling with a variety of life challenges. Taking
time away from work and childcare responsibilities to go to a police station to be
ﬁngerprinted, to make several trips to a courthouse, to ﬁnd a notary, and to mail all
these materials to the right addresses may be simply impossible, or at least diﬃcult
enough to be strongly discouraging.
Id.
Id. at 2478.
Expungements, CHESTER CNTY., PA.,
[https://perma.cc/CX46-DF6S].
155 Id.
153
154

https://www.chesco.org/3405/Expungements
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be ﬁled.156 Before ﬁlling out the paperwork, petitioners are tasked with
obtaining a Pennsylvania State Police background check, although the website
does not explain how to do so.157 Third, the website lists the diﬀerent types
of potential expungements, without oﬀering deﬁnitions of each category.
Finally, a fee of $167 is mentioned.158
The Maryland court system has a similar site.159 It immediately makes a
cryptic reference to a diﬀerence between expungement and shielding without
a full explanation.160 It does contain a six-part video series that appears to be
a “how-to-guide.”161 It also mentions a fee.162 Texas has a similar site, referring
to expungements and non-disclosures, which are diﬀerent remedies under
Texas law.163
New Jersey produces a thirty-four-page guide to expungement.164 The first
page quickly contains a disclaimer about the general nature of the guide and
states that the content does not replace consulting with a lawyer.165 It also refers
readers to statutory provisions themselves.166 In terms of formal requirements,
the New Jersey guide references obtaining information in advance of filing the
petition, obtaining a police background check, filling out multiple forms, filing
and serving forms, including proof of service forms, and that is all before
attending a hearing.167 There are directions relating to distributing forms prehearing and post-hearing, should an expungement order be issued. There are
four forms, and seven copies are requested, requiring careful attention to detail
for a lay petitioner unfamiliar with court procedures.168 While one of the better
guides, it nonetheless illustrates the types of difficulties faced by petitioners. It
is a dizzying array of references and processes.
Some states are moving away from these onerous requirements, although
not enough yet to call it a trend. For example, Pennsylvania’s Clean Slate Act
of 2018 creates an automated process to identify cases that are eligible for
See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1413(a)(2) (2020).
Id.
Id.
Expungement (Adult), MD. CTS. (Oct. 2018), https://mdcourts.gov/legalhelp/expungement
[https://perma.cc/S3LC-K2YH].
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Expungements and Nondisclosure Order, TEX. STATE L. LIBR. (Dec. 7, 2020, 9:04 AM),
https://guides.sll.texas.gov/expunctions-and-non-disclosure [https://perma.cc/XC9U-CB6Y].
164 N.J. CTS., HOW TO EXPUNGE YOUR CRIMINAL AND/OR JUVENILE RECORD (2009),
https://www.nj.gov/corrections/pdf/OTS/FRARA/ParoleHandbook/10557_expunge_kit-112012.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8AD-LZGV].
165 Id. at 1.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 5-7.
168 Id. at 5-6.
156
157
158
159
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expungement.169 If identiﬁed, relief could be granted without requiring
individuals to make individual determinations about eligibility. The Act also
allows for automation without the ﬁling of a petition or paying ﬁling fees.
California has done something similar for marijuana convictions that involve
conduct that is no longer illegal.170 It remains to be seen whether resource and
technological constraints typical for local jurisdictions will make the promise
of automation truly a reality. Additionally, automated relief in Pennsylvania
only occurs after a ten-year waiting period and for a limited number of
oﬀenses.171 Prior criminal history also has the ability to foreclose automated
relief.172 So the relief is neither immediate nor expansive.
b. Monetary Barriers
Fines, fees, and costs are also a barrier to expungement. First, consider that
the vast majority of petitioners have low incomes; indigence is a widespread
problem.173 In addition to this social reality, expungement statutes or
jurisdictional case law174 can require filing fees.175 The total cost to a petitioner
varies by state, and in some states by county,176 ranging from thirty to several
hundred dollars, and that is usually just for the processing by the court.177 That
amount does not take into account funds needed for travel to different agencies,
169 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122(a)(4)(i), 9122.2 (2020) (providing that the court will give notice
to oﬀender that his criminal history will be automatically expunged).
170 See Lindsay Schnell, Marijuana Reform: New California Law Gives People with Records a Do-Over,
USA TODAY (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/09/30/california-passes-landmarkmarijuana-law-residents-reclaim-lives/1340729002 [https://perma.cc/E3Z2-5QNL] (describing California
Assembly Bill 1793, which automated the process for expunging or sealing marijuana convictions).
171 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §9122.2(a)(1) (2020)
172 Id.
173 See Theresa Zhen, How Court Debt Erects Permanent Barriers to Reentry, TALK POVERTY
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://talkpoverty.org/2016/04/28/how-court-debt-erects-permanent-barriers-toreentry [https://perma.cc/T9RX-VWRX] (“One of the most signiﬁcant barriers to reentry is the
imposition of ﬁnes, fees, surcharges, costs, and other monetary penalties . . . .”).
174 See, e.g., State v. Doe, 927 N.W.2d 656, 659, 666 (Iowa 2019) (aﬃrming the district court’s
denial of petitioner’s motion to expunge her criminal record because Iowa law required her to ﬁrst
pay her court debts).
175 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225(2)(c) (2019).
176 AD HOC COMM., SUP. CT. OF KAN., REPORT ON BONDING PRACTICES, FINES, AND
FEES IN MUNICIPAL COURTS 39 https://www.kscourts.org/KSCourts/media/KsCourts/
court%20administration/AdHocCommitteeMunicipalCourtsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP2TWLLP] (“[E]xpungement fees in municipalities ranged from $25 to $250. The Committee
acknowledges a small-town clerk’s office with part-time prosecutors and a staff that does most
everything manually may incur a larger cost for a given service than a large municipality with full
time prosecutor and judicial staff, but the disparity is noteworthy.”).
177 JENNY MONTOYA TANSEY & KATHERINE CARLIN, CODE FOR AMERICA CLOSING THE
DELIVERY GAP 24 (2018), http://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/codeforamerica-cc.ms1/documents/Closingthe-Delivery-Gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBB3-LJCF] (noting California county processing fees from $30 to
$240).
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time taken off from work, and how other requirements affect income. Of
course, expungement is a worthwhile investment, but that presumes awareness
on the part of the petitioner of that reality, as well as short-term flexibility to
take actions that will pay off in the long run.178 While petitioners may be able
to file in forma pauperis, that status may require judicial process, thereby
deterring a petitioner from moving forward given the same access to justice
issues discussed in the previous Section. A few jurisdictions have moved
towards eliminating fees, but it is by no means the norm.179
In addition to ﬁling and paperwork fees, statutes often require that all
ﬁnes relating to a criminal sentence have been paid.180 This is so even where
restitution was not a crucial component of the sentence. These rules exist
despite the fact that ﬁnes and costs can derive primarily (or exclusively) from
administrative processing associated with any criminal case. Therefore, it is
not clear that requiring a zero balance actually indicates which petitioners
have successfully completed their sentences. The lack of debt related to a
criminal docket is a rough proxy, at best, for determining whether a petitioner
was compliant with the terms of his sentence. A few states have moved to
eliminate these requirements.181
178 See Prescott & Starr, supra note 10, at 2504 (“[T]hose without cash on hand may not have
the liquidity or ability to make such an investment or may be reluctant to do so when the long-term
beneﬁts are speculative.”).
179 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1419 (2020) (filing fee waived for filing of uniform petition);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-905(B) (2020) (prohibiting the clerk of the court from charging filing fees); H.R.
5341(D)(1), (1.5), (6)(C), 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2018) (waiving certain expungement fees and providing that
a court cannot deny an expungement petition because of an unpaid court debt, while also arguing that there
should be no fees to expunge charges that resulted in acquittal, dismissal, or a conviction that was later reversed
or vacated in counties with more than 3,000,000 people); see also Arizona HB 2312: Relating to Setting Aside a
Conviction, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (Mar. 15, 2018), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/arizonahb-2312-setting-aside-fee [https://perma.cc/ZJ43-EZ75] (recommending Arizona’s House Bill—which would
later become § 13-905(B)); Illinois HB 5341: Amendment, Criminal Identification Act Section 5.2, FINES & FEES
JUST. CTR. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/illinois-hb-5341-amendment-criminalidentification-act-section-5-2 [https://perma.cc/WU6H-VFV7] (recommending Illinois House Bill 5341).
180 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 610.140(5)(3) (2019) (requiring petitioners to pay ﬁnes and
restitutions before expungement); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-3A-5 (2020) (same); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-72-706(1)(e) (2020) (same); Frequently Asked Questions About Clean Slate, CMTY. LEGAL SERVS.
OF PHILA. (June 26, 2018), https://clsphila.org/employment/frequently-asked-questions-aboutclean-slate [https://perma.cc/UB9A-ASTV] (advising payment of ﬁnes and fees before applying for
expungement); Monica Llorente, Criminalizing Poverty Through Fines, Fees, and Costs, AM. BAR
ASS’N (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrensrights/articles/2016/criminalizing-poverty-ﬁnes-fees-costs [https://perma.cc/KS4S-JY6V] (ﬁnding
that people cannot vacate their records to regain their rights until they pay their ﬁnancial obligations
to the court).
181 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2630/5.2(d)(6)(C) (2020) (declaring that a court will not deny
an expungement petition because the petitioner has not paid a legal ﬁnancial obligation); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:52-5.3 (2020) (ordering that if a criminal debt has not been satisﬁed due to some reason
other than non-compliance, and ten years has passed since the crime, the court can still grant the
expungement application).
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c. Waiting Periods.
Decreasing waiting periods has been a popular reform and usually
correlates to diﬀerent types of public criminal records. States have
experimented in this ﬁeld, with some opting for graduated schemes instead
of uniformity. A spectrum exists here as well—some states have waiting
periods as short as several months, whereas others require ten or more years
before eligibility. Waiting periods almost always require “crime-free” terms,
and can extend beyond what recent studies have shown is the likely timeframe
for reoﬀending. Nevertheless, the theory behind waiting periods is the same
that supported expungement half a century ago: those who have not
recidivated and shown good behavior are now worth the risk.
Nearly all of the states that expunge convictions have required waiting
periods. For example, Illinois coupled its broad eligibility provisions with a
three-year waiting period for nearly every type of oﬀense.182 Maryland
accompanied its substantive reforms with a three-year waiting period
following completion of the last sentence.183 Louisiana added a ﬁve-year
waiting period.184 Kansas has a three to ﬁve-year window.185 Missouri, which
chose to shorten its waiting period, has a three-year period for misdemeanors
and a seven-year period for felonies.186 Minnesota linked waiting periods to
the seriousness of the oﬀense, opting for a graduated scheme.187 Colorado has
a similar scheme with a variable waiting period depending on the nature of
the oﬀense.188 Other states have ranges from one year to twenty.189 The norm
is somewhere between three to ﬁve years. Interestingly, that resembles the
data with respect to the risk of reoﬀending: recidivism rates can be highest in
the earliest years after release.190 Time is thus one factor in considering
riskiness.

20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2630/5.2(c)(3)(C).
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-303(A) (West 2020).
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 977(A)(2) (2020).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6614(2)(c) (2019).
MO. REV. STAT. §610.140(5)(1) (2019)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.02(3)(a)(3)-(5) (2019).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-706(b) (2020).
Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(a)-(c) (LexisNexis 2020) (requiring a waiting
period of one to three years or four to five if the offender had been convicted of multiple felonies),
with OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225(5)(a)(A)(i) (2019) (requiring a waiting period of one to twenty years).
190 Bill Keller, Seven Things to Know About Repeat Oﬀenders, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 9,
2016, 11:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/03/09/seven-things-to-know-aboutrepeat-oﬀenders [https://perma.cc/Z37G-NPXF] (noting that almost half of federal inmates are
arrested again within ﬁve years of release).
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
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d. Prosecutorial Intervention.
Statutes enable prosecutors to intervene during the expungement process,
thereby potentially resulting in an additional hill for a petitioner to climb.
Although some well-known prosecutors have become semi-partners during
the expungement process,191 the norm remains that prosecutors can object to
expungement for substantive and technical reasons.192
These mechanisms have been discussed in another Article,193 but it is
worth reiterating how much power prosecutors retain with respect to
preventing or, at the very least, stalling expungement.194 Several states permit
prosecutors to force a hearing on the merits through objection.195 This holds
for expungements relating to convictions and non-conviction charges. For
example, Ohio allows prosecutors to object, thereby requiring a court to
engage in a balancing test that permits denial of an expungement petition for
plenty of purposes.196
In some states, prosecutors essentially possess constructive veto power
over an expungement petition. Michigan, in the case of non-conviction or
acquitted charges, allows prosecutors to prevent expungement through
objection.197 Many states resemble Georgia, where prosecutors have a ﬁxed
period of time during which they can object to a petition for technical
reasons198; if the prosecutor does so, a formal notice is sent to the petitioner,199
potentially having a chilling eﬀect. At best, the petitioner then faces a clear
and convincing evidentiary standard in front of a court.200 Other states
involve prosecutors by essentially giving them the responsibility to prescreen
petitions on the merits before they go to the courts. Colorado and Vermont,
for example, permit automatic granting of expungement if a prosecutor does
191 Sealing
a
Criminal
Conviction,
MANHATTAN
DIST.
ATT’YS.
OFF.,
https://www.manhattanda.org/sealing/ [https://perma.cc/GL8F-6MVH]; Press Release, Manhattan
Dist. Att’ys. Oﬀ., Through Groundbreaking Class Action, Hundreds of New Yorkers Have Old
Marijuana Convictions Sealed (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.manhattanda.org/throughgroundbreaking-class-action-hundreds-of-new-yorkers-have-old-marijuana-convictions-sealed/
[https://perma.cc/R46T-C3WP].
192 See generally Murray, supra note 17.
193 Id.
194 The D.C. Code is a good example of how prosecutorial review and potential objection adds
delay to the process. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 16-805(b-e) (2020).
195 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(n)(3) (West 2018) (allowing prosecutors to decline an
individual’s request to their criminal history record information, which leads to a civil action to
remedy the prosecutorial discretion); but see COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-704(1)(c)(I)-(II) (2020)
(allowing judges to determine whether grounds for a hearing exist).
196 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.52-55 (LexisNexis 2020).
197 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.243(8)-(10) (2020).
198 GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(n)(2) (West 2018).
199 Id.
200 Id. § 35-3-37(n)(3).
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not object.201 In several jurisdictions, courts can only expunge without a
hearing if prosecutors do not furnish an initial objection.202 This means
adversarial actions by the prosecutor mandate hearings that are timeconsuming, sophisticated, and diﬃcult for lay petitioners to navigate.203
This potential hurdle exists even in states that have passed recent
substantive reforms, including with automated relief. For example, after
California passed a sweeping law that would allow for the expungement of
old marijuana convictions, the California Attorney General was tasked with
sending information to local district attorneys about which cases were
eligible. But local prosecutors could challenge the expungement,204 thereby
subjecting otherwise-immediate relief to the discretionary review of one
public oﬃcial who might have diﬀerent policy views than the legislature on
the issue. The same holds for the Clean Slate Act in Pennsylvania.205
On the ﬂip side, some states have left room for prosecutors to partner
with petitioners. For example, Texas gives prosecutors unilateral authority to
waive otherwise existing waiting period requirements.206 Courts shall issue
expungements for certain non-conviction charges if the prosecutor does so.207
Delaware allows expungement if prosecutors initiate the process by ﬁling a

201

COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-704(1)(c)(I) (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7602(a)(3)

(2020).
202 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907.01(B) (2020) (“If the prosecutor does not oppose the
application, the court may grant the application and vacate the conviction without a hearing.”); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B)(i) (2020) (“If notice of opposition is not ﬁled, the court may
grant the uniform petition.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(d) (West 2020) (“In any case where a
person has been arrested and an accusatory pleading has been ﬁled, but where no conviction has
occurred, the court may, with the concurrence of the prosecuting attorney, grant the relief provided
in subdivision (b) at the time of the dismissal of the accusatory pleading.”); see also 20 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 2630/5.2(d)(6)(B) (2020) (requiring the court to grant or deny a petition if no objection
is ﬁled); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-9(a) (2020) (allowing a court to grant a petition for
expungement without a hearing if the prosecutor does not object); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC.
§ 10-303(d)(2) (West 2020) (allowing a court to grant a petition for shielding criminal records if the
State’s Attorney does not ﬁle an objection); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-11 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-40-107(7) (LexisNexis 2020) (allowing a court to grant a petition for expungement without a
hearing if no objection is received); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2(F) (West 2020) (allowing a court
to enter an order of expungement without conducting a hearing if the prosecutor gives written notice
that they (1) do not object to the order and (2) the continued existence of the record would be unjust
to the petitioner).
203 See Murray, supra note 17, at 2848 (“Objections to expungement, warranted or not, often
require that the matter be listed for a hearing, thereby demanding the presence of both parties and
an evidentiary showing.”).
204 LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 129, at 11.
205 Id. at 10-11.
206 TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 55.01(a)-(b) (West 2020).
207 Id.
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petition.208 And several other states allow for automatic expungement if the
prosecutor does not object.209
2. Hearing Standards: Public Safety Calculations and the Burden of Proof
Under most state statutes, expungement petitions can progress to a
hearing in front of a judge. The paths to a hearing are numerous. Some
statutes require hearings, while others reserve them for when the prosecutor
objects to expungement. Regardless, expungement law varies from state to
state with respect to how courts are tasked with adjudicating petitions. Some
state courts have crafted standards of review, whereas other states have
statutes that prescribe the consideration of certain factors. The common
theme is balancing: courts assess whether the potential harm to the petitioner
caused by a public criminal record outweighs the state’s interest in keeping
the record in place. That balancing then turns into an assessment of the
riskiness of granting the petition, based on the positive characteristics put
forth by the petitioner. In many jurisdictions, the burden falls on the
petitioner to demonstrate why a conviction should be expunged.210
a. The Balancing Approach.
Balancing tests come from statutes themselves or through case law
applying the statutes. For example, the D.C. Code outlines factors that courts
must consider when determining whether an expungement petition should
be granted. The Code references “the interests of justice” before listing three
umbrella interests: (1) “the interests of the movant”; (2) “the community’s
interest in retaining access to those records, including the interest of current
or prospective employers . . . and the interest in promoting public safety”;
and (3) “the community’s interest in furthering the movant’s rehabilitation
and enhancing the movant’s employability.”211 Thus, immediately the
petitioner’s privacy, the community’s interest in public safety, and the
petitioner’s level of rehabilitation guide the court’s discretion. But then the
statute goes further, authorizing scrutiny into the nature of the case and the
“history and characteristics” of the movant, including the movant’s “character;
physical and mental condition; employment history; prior and subsequent
conduct; history relating to [substance abuse]; criminal history; and eﬀorts at
rehabilitation . . . .”212 Notice that almost all of the sub-factors relate to what
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4374(h) (2020).
See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 16-803(2)(G)(i)(1)-(3) (2020) (placing the burden on the movant
for petitions relating to convictions).
211 § 16-803(h)(2)(A)-(C).
212 § 16-803(h)(2)(A)-(C)(i)-(vii).
208
209
210
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the petitioner can demonstrate in terms of rehabilitation, and to an
assessment of riskiness.
Other jurisdictions have similar statutory schemes. For example, New
Mexico’s new law permitting expungement of convictions reflects a recent trend
tying mandatory expungement to judicial findings of minimal risk, using
criminal history as a proxy for risk. After a hearing, courts “shall” issue an order
“if the court finds that” there are no charges pending, justice will be served, and
no other criminal conviction has occurred for a certain period of time.213 The
statute prescribes clear rules regarding the necessary window of time after the
conviction sought to be expunged.214 To determine whether justice will be
served, the court “shall consider” the nature and gravity of the offense, the
petitioner’s age, criminal history, and employment history, the length of time
that has passed since completion of the sentence, any specific adverse
consequences the petitioner might face, and the district attorney’s objections.215
This regime is similar to new laws in other states that promise broader
eligibility but are still subject review to concerns about privacy and risk, and
task courts with assessing rehabilitation. Under Arkansas law, similar factors
guide decisions relating to expungement of felony convictions, while also
instructing the judge to consider “[a]ny other information . . . that would
cause a reasonable person to consider the person a further threat to society.”216
Minnesota explicitly references “the risk . . . the petitioner poses to
individuals or society” and “the steps taken by the petitioner toward
rehabilitation . . . .”217 Colorado’s statute for expunging convictions, eﬀective
in August 2019, references similar factors to New Mexico’s, noting how a court
should consider the “privacy of the defendant,” “criminal history,” the severity
of the oﬀense, and the quantity of convictions.218 New Hampshire’s law,
eﬀective August 2018, authorizes expungement when it will “assist in the
petitioner’s rehabilitation.”219 Illinois’s law, eﬀective January 1, 2020, and
considered one of the more progressive expungement regimes, parrots the
factors in the previous states, referencing “the strength of the evidence
supporting the defendant’s conviction,” the state’s reasons for retaining the
record, “the petitioner’s age, criminal record history, and employment
history,” the length of time between conviction and the petition, and any
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-3A-5C (2020).
§ 29-3A-5C(4).
§ 29-3A-5E. Notably, these factors look very similar to those outlined by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981) and used by other states.
216 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1415(b)(1)(E) (2020).
217 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.03(5)(c)(1)-(12) (2019). It also references the petitioner’s record
of employment, community involvement, and the nature and circumstances of the crime. Id.
218 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-706(1)(g) (2020).
219 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:5(I) (LexisNexis 2018).
213
214
215
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speciﬁc consequences faced by the petitioner if the petition is denied.220 Like
the other states, the majority of Illinois’s factors focus on the privacy interests
of the petitioner and whether the petitioner’s lifestyle and employment
prospects suggest minimal risk. Several other states import factors like these
when considering the expungement of convictions, conﬁrming that the
privacy/public safety/rehabilitation paradigm persists.221
Vermont’s regime takes a slightly more amorphous approach by statute.
Like New Mexico, it links judicial discretion to a judicial ﬁnding of
nonrecidivism since completion of a sentence, the payment of all ﬁnes and
restitution, and that “expungement . . . serves the interests of justice.”222 The
last phrase is not given clear meaning by the statute, leaving more room for
consideration of a wide range of factors. But the rest of the statute links
expungement to periods of nonrecidivism. Thus, like in New Mexico, even
when the statute tries to limit judicial discretion, the privacy/public
safety/rehabilitation paradigm continues to dominate decision-making.
Not all states retain these multi-factored tests. Some states have limited
judicial discretion to determining whether the petitioner has complied with
technical requirements,223 plus adherence to the waiting period. Indiana has
20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2630/5.2(d)(7) (2020).
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6614(h)(1)-(3) (2019) (referencing nonrecidivism, “the
circumstances and behavior of the petitioner,” and the “public welfare”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 431.073(4)(a)(1-4) (West 2020) (requiring expungement for felony convictions to be consistent
with “welfare and safety of the public,” and the petitioner’s “behavior since the conviction”); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 780.621(14) (2020) (referencing “circumstances and behavior of an applicant” and
the “public welfare”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.03(5)(a) (2019) (referencing beneﬁt to the
petitioner that counterbalances disadvantages to public safety); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-71(2)(b)
(2019) (requiring proof of rehabilitation for the convicted oﬀense); MO. REV. STAT. § 610.140(5)(1)(6) (2019) (referencing nonrecidivism, the “petitioner’s habits and conduct” indicate that he is “not
a threat to the public safety” and “public welfare”); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 160.59(7)(d), (f)-(g)
(Consol. 2020) (referencing the “character of the defendant, including any measures that the
defendant has taken toward rehabilitation,” the “impact of sealing . . . upon . . . rehabilitation and
upon his or her successful and productive reentry and reintegration into society,” and “the impact of
sealing . . . on public safety”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-145(b) (referencing “good behavior”); § 15A145.5(c) (referencing “good moral character”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(e)(2) (LexisNexis
2020) (referencing judicial determination of “rehabilitation of an applicant”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 19(C) (referencing “harm to privacy of the person”); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225(3) (2019)
(referencing “the circumstances and behavior of the applicant”); 12 R.I. STAT. § 12-1.3-3 (2020)
(noting discretion of court to determine whether petitioner has “exhibited good moral character”
and “rehabilitation has been attained to the court’s satisfaction”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32101(g)(5) (2020) (referencing “interest of justice and public safety”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40107(8) (LexisNexis 2020) (implying rehabilitation for drug oﬀenses); W. VA. CODE § 61-1126(d)(10) (2020) (requiring petitioner to aver in petition the “steps . . . taken . . . toward personal
rehabilitation”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-1501(g) (2020) (focusing on whether petitioner is a
“substantial danger”).
222 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 7602(b)(1)(A)-(D) (2020).
223 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-14 (2020) (relying on statutory bases, rather than judicial
discretion, to deny expungement).
220
221

2021]

Retributive Expungement

701

such an approach, using the waiting period as the primary determinant of
whether a court shall issue an expungement.224 Kentucky and Maryland have
a similar approach, linking automatic expungement of certain misdemeanor
convictions to compliance with the waiting period.225
b. Burdens of Proof
Jurisdictions either place the burden of proof squarely on the petitioner
or move it between the state and the petitioner depending on the type of
charge and whether the record is a conviction rather than arrest. For example,
the D.C. Code moves the burden from the state to the petitioner if the charge
is a conviction.226 Arkansas places the burden on the state for arrests and
misdemeanor convictions, but on the petitioner for felony convictions.227
Oregon places the burden on the state for certain types of convictions, like
third degree robbery or attempted assault, if the procedural components of
the petition are otherwise valid.228 Kansas’s law, eﬀective June 2019, requires
petitioners to meet a “clear and convincing” standard for felony
convictions.229 Minnesota230 and West Virginia231 have the same standard.
Delaware, in a new law eﬀective in 2020, places the burden on the
“petitioner to allege speciﬁc facts in support of that petitioner’s allegation of
manifest injustice.”232 If the petitioner can make that showing, the court must
grant the expungement. Although no reported case law exists for the new law,
case law from the statute that preceded it, which had reserved expungement
to non-conviction charges under the same standard, reiterated the petitioner’s
burden. It referenced the damaging eﬀects of a criminal record on the
reputation of a non-convicted person without a criminal history as crucial to
that showing.233 At the very least, the petitioner must supplement the petition
for expungement with an aﬃdavit containing speciﬁc facts supporting an
assertion of “manifest injustice.”234
224 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-2(e) (2020) (for misdemeanor convictions); id. § 3538-9-3(e) (for class D felony convictions); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.245(5) (2019) (using a
waiting period to determine whether the court can seal criminal records).
225 KY. REV. STAT. § 431.078(4)(a)-(d) (West 2020); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10303(e)(2) (West 2020).
226 D.C. CODE §§ 16-803(2)(G)(i)(1)-(3).
227 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1415(a)-(e) (2020).
228 OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225(12) (2019).
229 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.073(4)(a) (West 2020).
230 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.03(5) (2019).
231 W. VA. CODE § 61-11-26(h) (2020).
232 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4374(f) (2020).
233 Jones v. Delaware, No. N18X-01-018, 2018 WL 2684073, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 4, 2018).
234 See Webster v. Delaware, No. K16X-06-002, 2016 WL 5939166, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept.
2, 2016) (noting that the burden rests on the petitioner and that an aﬃdavit with speciﬁc facts was
necessary to meet it).
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Nevada is on an island with its establishment of a “rebuttable presumption
that . . . records should be sealed if the applicant satisfies all statutory
requirements for the sealing of records.”235 New Jersey represents a moderate
approach, requiring the state to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
its need for the record to be available outweighs the petitioner’s interest.236
The aforementioned hearing procedures and allocations of the burden of
proof indicate that public safety considerations and the rehabilitation of the
petitioner are front and center when assessing the merits of an expungement
petition, and that privacy interests, juxtaposed with the interests of the state,
lurk in the backdrop. The reality is that a majority of state expungement laws
continue to operate in that paradigm, resulting in onerous procedures, likely
contributing to the uptake gap.
IV. A NEW PARADIGM: RETRIBUTIVE EXPUNGEMENT
The preceding sections illustrate the limits of the public safety and
privacy-based paradigm that has characterized expungement for over a half
century. Procedures have resulted in burdensome obstacles that do not fully
comport with the promise of expungement. These procedures are tethered to
the initial rehabilitative logic underlying expungement, undermining the
promise of the remedy by requiring individuals to prove their mettle. This
mistakenly focuses the inquiry on the individual’s ability to prove
rehabilitation, within a broader utilitarian calculus, rather than obligating the
state to justify and police the limits of the punishment it imposes through the
criminal justice system. Instead of solely using rehabilitation as the basis for
understanding the place of expungement in criminal law, a diﬀerent lens—
retributive expungement—can help refocus procedure to comport with the
promise of substantive expungement reform by placing the onus on the
state.237 This Part outlines the parameters of a retributivist approach to
expungement, suggesting that retributivist constraints—long applicable in
the sentencing context—can help further the promise of expungement for
those who deserve it.

NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.2445(1) (2019).
See In re LoBasso, 33 A.3d 540, 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) ( “The State must
prove the predominating need for record availability by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
237 Joy Radice advances a similar argument. See Radice, supra note 21, at 1331 (“[I]f our cultural
perception of a person’s conviction status is to be changed, the state also needs to play a role, and
even take the lead, in removing the criminal stigma.”).
235
236
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A. Retributivist Constraints
Retributivist principles can help counteract the stigma associated with a
public criminal record by infusing procedures with renewed focus on
blameworthiness and proportionality and the obligations of the state after the
completion of a sentence. These principles are applicable to the stigma that
persists after a direct sentence has been completed.238 That understanding
leaves room for retributivist concepts of blameworthiness and proportionality
to supplement already useful public safety-based critiques.239 To be clear, the
issue is not whether criminal record history information should be wholly
private; rather, the central concern is for how long the information should
remain public,240 when a petitioner should be presumptively aﬀorded a
remedy, and how that remedy should come about.241
What principles within retributivism might be helpful? While there are
many diﬀerent types of retributivism, they share some common themes.242
These include: recognizing oﬀender dignity, the dual function of punishment
as responsive to desert and restorative of the social equilibrium that was
violated, proportionality, and that blameworthiness should help tailor
punishment.243 These premises have been developed by several thinkers,
either as a positive case for retributivism or to clarify how retributivist
principles can help constrain punishment otherwise justiﬁed on utilitarian
grounds from running amok, which is often called “negative retributivism.”244
At the very least, these premises start from the notion that punishment must

238 Douglas N. Husak, Already Punished Enough, 18 PHIL. TOPICS 79, 95 (1990) (“The
dependence theory allows the state to make whatever adjustments . . . to ensure that the overall
quantum of punishment satisﬁes the demands of proportionality.”).
239 Utilitarian concepts of proportionality certainly can rationalize easing expungement. The
costs of stigma are high. Such stigma likely correlates with recidivism, and the deterrent value of
public criminal records is diﬃcult to decipher, thereby calling into question their justiﬁcation for an
extended period of time. For a similar argument with respect to mitigating collateral consequences,
see Hugh LaFollette, Consequences of Punishment: Civil Penalties Accompanying Formal Punishment, 22
J. APPLIED PHIL. 241 251 (2005).
240 See Corda, supra note 60, at 44 (discussing proportionality and public criminal records availability).
241 The when and the how of expungement are necessarily procedural questions, which is the
focus of this Article, rather than the breadth of substantive reform, which, amongst other topics,
includes the length of time that a record can or should remain public.
242 See Andrew Oldenquist, An Explanation of Retribution, 85 J. PHIL. 464, 474 (1988) (labeling
retributive justice as a “cluster concept.”).
243 Murray, supra note 61, at 1036-37 (discussing shared premises of retributivism).
244 See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER,
AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed. 1987)
(“Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who receive
it.”) (italics omitted). The various types of retributivism that exist are beyond the scope of this Article.
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account for inherent human dignity, refrain from instrumentalization, and be
calibrated to blameworthiness.245
The extended existence of public criminal records implicates retributivist
principles in a couple of ways. First, permanent availability of conviction
information, without careful distinctions between the types of convictions,
can lead to state-permitted246 punishment beyond the desert basis.
Punishment should be correlated to blameworthiness and proportionality
principles. Expungement regimes must make careful distinctions between the
nature of oﬀenses, and should refrain from blanket classiﬁcations by the grade
of an oﬀense. For example, the term felony connotes very diﬀerent levels of
conduct. Some felonies are violent, some are not. Some involve clear victims,
others do not. Many crimes classiﬁed as felonies today were not felonies
throughout American history.247 Additionally, most criminal statutes require
a mens rea and distinguish between levels of culpability. Finally, given that
the vast majority of convictions are obtained via plea deal, the name of a
conviction is not a proxy for blameworthiness.248 Thus, even if the stigma
from a public criminal record is considered part of the desert basis, linking it
to generic terminological categories, such as all felonies, misuses labels as a
proxy for blameworthiness.
With respect to proportionality, if direct sentences are meant to be
proportionate, and stigma by virtue of the public criminal record goes beyond
that, then the state is at least permitting extra punishment, if not licensing it
when it furnishes criminal record data for a proﬁt.249 In the case of arrests,
245 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 492
(1997) (explaining that by forgoing punishment, rehabilitation acknowledges and forgives the
oﬀender’s blameworthiness); Michael Tonry, Punishment and Human Dignity: Sentencing Principles for
Twenty-First Century America, 47 CRIME & JUST. 119, 128 (“There are many diﬀerent kinds of
retributive theory, but they share the view that moral blameworthiness is an important consideration
in determining just punishments.”).
246 A common objection is the notion that in a liberal, democratic society, the operation of the
criminal law must remain public, and that public criminal records are not punishment. My view is
that this falls into the camp of the state permitting punishment that goes beyond the formal
parameters of the criminal law. In other words, there is a diﬀerence between criminal punishment
and punishment. But both require justiﬁcation, as both involve activity of the state, just in diﬀerent
ways (commission v. permission). Given that both results implicate state interests, condemnation,
and can be regulated by the state, the state has a role to play.
247 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 439-40 (1976) (J. Marshall, dissenting) (noting
the substantive changes in felonies).
248 Radice, supra note 21, at 1337 (“[A] criminal history is merely a jumble of codes, at times
inaccurate, that tells a person nothing about how the information on the report relates to risk.”);
Jacobs, supra note 27, at 74 (comparing criminal record history information to the raw data on a
credit report).
249 NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER & STIGMA: THE MORALITY OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 161 (1980) (“[I]f the punishment ordered by the court is meant to be commensurate or
proportional to the offen[s]e, any extra hardship resulting from stigma will distort the balance between
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where the desert basis is questionable, permitted punishment risks
undermining the entire criminal project, not to mention weakening the
presumption of innocence.250 Proportionality constraints require a second
look at this problem.
There are two ways to think about proportionality from a retributivist
standpoint: cardinal and ordinal proportionality. Cardinal proportionality is
the principle that a sentence should be no more severe than is deserved based
on the seriousness of the crime and the offender’s culpability.251 The word that
might best describe this concept is “commensurate.” This idea can be elusive.
Does it reflect the lex talionis?252 Is it measured by the amount of harm caused
to a victim? What if the crime did not involve a victim or measurable tangible
harm? In other words, how can one measure the difference in degree required
for cardinal proportionality? For some, these difficult, epistemic questions
render the entire retributive system useless.253 For others, they partner desert
with humility, thereby limiting the retributive project.254 The latter approach
certainly comports with modern sensibilities against over-punishment and
presuppositions underlying liberal democratic regimes.
Although the concept of proportionality might be diﬃcult to fully grasp,
that does not render it unworthy of consideration. For it may be the case that
while proportionality cannot be deﬁnitively quantiﬁed, ranges or spectrums
can at least be intuited and then coupled with humility.255 This is the basis of

the offen[s]e and the punishment.”); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 14 (1993)
(“The censure and the hard treatment are intertwined in the way punishment is structured.”).
250 Diane Becker Potash, Maintenance and Dissemination of Criminal Records: A Legislative
Proposal, 19 UCLA L. REV. 654, 668 (1972).
251 ZACHARY HOSKINS, BEYOND PUNISHMENT?: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE
COLLATERAL LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION 81 (2019).
252 The lex talionis conveys a principle of retaliation, often measured by the harm initially
inﬂicted. It arguably has Biblical roots. See W. Justin Ilboudo, The Lex Talionis in the Hebrew Bible
and
Jewish
Tradition,
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/ﬁles/research_sites/cjl/pdf/Justin%20Ilboudo_Research%20Paper.
pdf [https://perma.cc/X2VE-SMGL].
253 BERNARD BOSANQUET, SOME SUGGESTIONS IN ETHICS 188, 203 (1918) (“There is no
estimate which can determine degrees of moral guilt in actual individual cases. Such a thing is wholly
inconceivable.”); JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN
THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 179 (1990) (“The vagueness of desert . . . masks mistakes.”); Leo
Katz, Criminal Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 90, 90–91
(Dennis Patterson ed., 1996); Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1263 (2005); Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice
of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 893 (2002); Russ Shafer-Landau, Retributivism and
Desert, 81 PAC. PHIL. Q. 189, 189 (2000).
254 See generally Mary Sigler, Humility, Not Doubt, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 158, 159 (2018) (“Kolber
aims to undermine retributivism altogether by miring it in doubt and uncertainty.”).
255 HOSKINS, supra note 251, at 84 (“[W]e can at least appeal to the notion of desert to rule
out sentences that are clearly too harsh or too lenient.”); id. at 87 (“Virtually any plausible normative
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what some have labeled “limited retributivism,” or “side-constrained
retributivism.”256 In other words, while agreement about the desert basis with
exact precision might not be possible, shared intuitions can tell us whether
the state furnishing a public criminal record for an entire lifetime is
presumptively problematic or not by creating a spectrum with permissible
ranges.257 What happens within the spectrum is then colored by ordinal
proportionality principles and can be informed by other purposes.258
Ordinal proportionality attempts to calibrate punishments to each other
by focusing on parity, rank-ordering, and spacing. Parity suggests that similar
oﬀenses should receive similar punishment. Rank-ordering places serious
oﬀenses at the top, with longer sentences, and vice versa. Spacing involves
the area between diﬀerent punishments: diﬀerences in punishment should
reﬂect diﬀerences in seriousness between crimes.259 Scholars have criticized
collateral consequences on ordinal proportionality grounds, pointing out how
low-level felons lose the same beneﬁts as serial murderers.260
There is a third reason why expungement should catch the eye of the
retributivist: the retributivist should be concerned that once an oﬀender has
paid the debt connected to the conviction, thereby receiving the required
desert, the state should not actively cause that debt to continue to limit the
person’s ability to reenter.261 In other words, retributivist principles
principle will be supported by at least some intuitions that do not themselves admit of deeper
analysis.”).
256 NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST
SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM 3 (2013).
257 See Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, in 16 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 55, 75-79 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992) (discussing how cardinal
proportionality creates a framework for determining sentences within the structure); Robinson &
Kurzban, supra note 24, at 1835 (referencing how modern desert theorists focus on ordinal
proportionality).
258 See Peter Koritansky, Two Theories of Retributive Punishment: Immanuel Kant and Thomas
Aquinas, 22 HIST. PHIL. Q. 319, 335 (2005) (“What criminals deserve, in other words, is determined
by estimating the seriousness of the criminal act and is realized by imposing a correspondingly
serious penalty within the parameters of a reasonable determination of what will place the criminal
back upon equal terms with the rest of the law abiding citizenry.”).
259 For example, if criminal trespass at night (a) is slightly worse than criminal trespass during
the day, but burglary (b) is way worse than both (c), then the distance between (a) and (b) should
be small, with (c) far from both.
260 Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 35 (Marc Mauer
& Meda Chesney-Lind eds. 2002) (identifying that “collateral sanctions” are incompatible with
proportionality); LaFollette, supra note 239, at 244-46 (claiming that collateral consequences conﬂict
with the intuition that “punishment should be proportional to the crime.”); HOSKINS, supra note
251, at 90 (noting that collateral consequences violate ordinal proportionality principles of parity
and rank-ordering).
261 See Zachary Hoskins, Ex-oﬀender Restrictions, 31 J. APPLIED PHIL. 33, 39 (2014) (noting that
deserved retribution for past crimes cannot “justify continuing to impose burdens after
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contemplate state activity after the direct sentence to ensure extra
punishment does not come about. The state has signiﬁcant rule of law and
penal interests in ensuring that extra punishment is not meted out that
counteracts already restored order. Nothing less than the restorative nature
of the criminal law262 is at stake, which is crucial to the integrity of the
criminal justice system. It also comports with how many individuals perceive
the criminal justice system: as a means to justice and restoration.
B. Desert-Based Expungement Procedure
The above-mentioned principles allow expungement to provide an
opportunity for the state to complete the process of punishment, clinching
the supposed restorative aspects of desert.263 By stopping extra punishment
via expungement, the state is mindful of how a petitioner’s payment of the
debt means something real to the individual and to the community that had
ordered it.264 It communicates the end game of the criminal law in particular
cases, the point at which societal order has been restored, and the basis for
punishment has ended. The state that fails to take these principles seriously
actually undermines the meting out of desert in the future because the
connection between desert and the crime becomes murkier if punishment
endures forever. The sections below identify how these principles might
inform expungement procedure.
1. Proportionality, Pre-Hearing Procedure, and Automatic Expungement
Proportionality principles have implications for the types of oﬀenses
eligible for expungement as well as the types of procedures that might be
required to pursue expungement. These proportionality principles might be
reﬂected in the initial period of time during which the state keeps a record
[oﬀenders] . . . complete their sentences.”); Murray, supra note 17, at 2841 (discussing the rationale
for expungement based on the rehabilitation of ex-oﬀenders).
262 Admittedly, some scholars might not conceive retributivism in this way, preferring the term
“reconstructivism.” See Kleinfeld, supra note 75, at 1486 (“[R]econstructivism views crimes as
communicative attacks on embodied ethical life: crimes threaten social solidarity by undermining
the ideas, practices, and institutions at the foundation of social solidarity.”). As mentioned elsewhere,
reconstructivism seems like a branch stemming from the original retributivist tree, but one that is
particularly mindful of post-Enlightenment political and social ﬁrst principles. It can be contrasted
with what I have labeled “restorative retributivism” in another Article. See Brian M. Murray,
Restorative Retributivism, 52 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 21) (on ﬁle
with author) (describing teleologically-based retributivism as having a similar emphasis on the social
implications of punishment as reconstructivism).
263 Murray, supra note 17, at 2841 (“[E]xpungement might be labeled the completion of the retributive
process because it stops the informal, and perhaps unintentional, effects of formal punishment.”).
264 Murray, supra note 67, at 914 (“By preventing extra punishment, expungement furthers the
restorative components of retributivism.”).
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public (hereinafter “initial duration”) and the date by which a record becomes
eligible for expungement or automatically expunged.
First, both cardinal and ordinal proportionality principles suggest
thinking critically about the initial duration during which a criminal record
remains public, prior to eligibility for expungement, rather than presuming
that criminal records should remain perpetually available. Cardinal
proportionality principles urge that the degree of publicity should correlate
to the seriousness of the crime, as well as the culpability of the oﬀender.
Currently, public criminal recordkeeping systems only discriminate between
adult and juvenile oﬀenses with respect to initial publicity, with juvenile
records remaining sealed for the most part. But adult murder, theft, and
disorderly conduct convictions have the same default duration: forever.
Cardinal proportionality would support a distinction in degree, as the desert
basis for one crime is diﬀerent than for another. And that desert basis could
inform the timeline for the public aspect of the criminal record. In other
words, depending on the seriousness of the crime and the culpability of the
oﬀender, the state could create an index of presumed duration of publicity
that reﬂects the desert basis. Serious crimes with high culpability exist at one
end of the spectrum, with an initial public duration that is very long, and vice
versa. This is feasible, and could reﬂect relatively nuanced and ﬁxed intuitions
of justice found to exist when lay individuals judge the seriousness of crimes
and what type of punishment is deserved.265
What about ordinal proportionality principles? Parity would suggest that
serious felonies should receive the longest initial duration and minor
infractions the shortest. Rank-ordering would call for ensuring that lowerlevel convictions do not remain public longer than more serious convictions.
And spacing principles would aim to construct a regime where the initial
duration reﬂects a judgment about the diﬀerence in seriousness of the crime.
These principles, in turn, would inform the progression to a state-initiated
sealing phase, at the moment that proportionality has been reached.
Upon reaching that date, the data that was public could transition to a
“sealed” phase, after which it is accessible with some work on the part of the
party trying to obtain it. Or, automatic expungement could occur at this point.
Recent reforms have reached something like this on non-retributive grounds.
But there are two key distinctions here. First, these principles support a stateinitiated process given the demands of proportionality. Retributivist
proportionality constraints therefore can serve as arguments in favor of
automated expungement, or at least an automated beginning to the
expungement process. The initiation of the process is contingent on how the
265 Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 24, at 1845-1865. When it comes to expungement statutes,
legislatures already do this to some degree, ﬁxing waiting periods relative to the type of oﬀense.
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seriousness of the crime and the culpability of the offender inform the initial
period of time during which a criminal record remains public. But once that
has been satisfied, the state’s obligation to cease the infliction of desert kicks
in: expungement becomes the final act that ends punishment, thereby
synthesizing the punitive and restorative nature of the state response to crime.
The second key feature that distinguishes retributive-based expungement
from current regimes is that automated expungement would not be
contingent on proof of rehabilitation or nonrecidivism. The most recent
reforms—such as in Pennsylvania and Utah266—still link automated
expungement to proof of a period of rehabilitation, or at least full compliance
with the law post-conviction. But retributivist constraints suggest an
alternative route that would be open to expungement without such a showing.
What are the implications of this logic for current expungement
procedure? As mentioned above, existing expungement procedure is rife with
pre-judgment hurdles relating to paperwork, ﬁling, monetary costs, and
preliminary showings.267 A proper concern for the connection between a
public criminal record and the desert basis suggests that many of these
hurdles add disproportionate burdens. Retributive-minded expungement
would do away with many of these obstacles, instead opting for a more
streamlined, state-driven process with few burdens falling on the former
oﬀender. By linking expungement to whether desert already happened, rather
than whether the ex-oﬀender can prove that rehabilitation has occurred, the
state becomes the key player in the process, not the individual. It’s the
diﬀerence between an expungement regime designed to ﬁnd the worthy and
one designed to prevent the state from punishing more than was deserved.
Admittedly, a law like the Pennsylvania Clean Slate Act comes close to these
ideas, although a closer look reveals the tentacles of the rehabilitative-based
paradigm. That law permits the state to identify and automatically expunge
certain types of convictions provided that they meet statutory requirements
that can be determined via automated process.268 This has the great benefit of
chopping down the procedural overgrowth described above. But even
Pennsylvania’s law—considered by many to be the most forward-looking at the
moment—only permits automated expungement for non-conviction charges
and a limited number of low-level misdemeanor convictions, and only after
several years of “crime-free” behavior.269 That last requirement is the

266 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9122, 9122.2 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-40-103 et seq.
(LexisNexis 2020)
267 See supra Part III.
268 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122.2.
269 Margaret Love, Automated Sealing Nears Enactment in Pennsylvania, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES
RESOURCE
CTR.
(June
25,
2018),
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rehabilitative paradigm retaining its firm grip on expungement procedure, with
expungement primarily tethered to individual merit.
The communicative eﬀect of such a state-sponsored process cannot be
underestimated. First, it would communicate ﬁnality in the criminal process.
That ﬁnality would come after warranted desert. The end of the criminal
process invokes a new beginning for the individual, and a new relationship
between the individual and the state. Punishment has been meted out and
social order restored, and thus the individual both should be, and as a practical
matter is, free to rejoin society. Second, state-initiated expungement mindful
of the obligations of desert would ensure that hope for oﬀenders remains
despite prior behavior, and a hope that springs forth from the community
itself. The state that is not callously indiﬀerent to the fate of its oﬀenders is
a state that communicates that it takes each member of the community
seriously, no matter what.270 This is a principle that also underlies
enforcement of the criminal law and its social components.
2. Burdens of Proof
While the analysis above suggests retributivist principles can justify
automated expungement, there may be some circumstances that warrant a
hearing in front of a decision-maker. For example, it might be the case that
certain crimes have such a high desert basis that the state decides to create
procedures that preserve hearings as an opportunity for various stakeholders
to play a part in the decision.271 That seems completely reasonable in a liberal
democratic regime, especially one where penal purposes beyond retribution
are part of the criminal justice process. As such, state-initiated expungement
could still result in a hearing at which a ﬁnal determination is made. But what
should that hearing entail and what should be the standard of review?
As mentioned above, many existing expungement regimes place the
burden of persuasion on the petitioner at the hearing, either overtly, or in
practice given the procedural hurdles to relief. This seems to be exactly
backwards according to retributivist constraints, which would presume that
the state must continue to justify the retention of a public record for either
additional punitive reasons or some other reason. Assuming that a petitioner
is eligible for expungement due to the satisfaction of desert already assigned,
the state can assert one of two arguments: (1) the initial desert calculation,

https://ccresourcecenter.org/2018/06/25/automatic-sealing-nears-enactment-in-pennsylvania/
[https://perma.cc/QP2B-PDGG].
270 Murray, supra note 262, at 18 (discussing “retributivist callousness” and its effects on society).
271 Expungement statutes tend to restrict eligibility to certain offenses. Offenses that are typically
ineligible for expungement include those related to homicide, sexual assault, and violent offenses.
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linked to the public criminal record, was incorrect; or (2) there is some other
reason to preserve the record, unrelated to the initial punishment doled out.
What would this look like in practice? States would need to acknowledge,
preferably by statute, that at a hearing the state must make a showing on one
of these two grounds. The statute should clearly ascribe the burden to the
state rather than simply provide factors for consideration. Presumptions in
favor of expungement can be justiﬁed based on the above principles, likely in
the form of a sliding scale that takes into account oﬀense seriousness and
blameworthiness. The petitioner should not be required to make a showing,
although permitted to do so in response to any showing that the state makes.
With respect to the ﬁrst possible argument put forth by the state, the
burden should be high given legislative judgments already made regarding
the initial duration of the public criminal record before it is eligible for
expungement. If the legislature has already deemed an oﬀense expungementeligible after a set period of time, then a prosecutor must be tasked with
providing a clear and convincing justiﬁcation to a judge as to why a particular
case should be distinguished.
What about the standard of review for the second possible argument?
Some existing expungement regimes allow preservation of a record if the
state, by a preponderance of the evidence, indicates some need for the
information. This bar seems too low given the diﬀuse and signiﬁcant
consequences of a public criminal record. Expungement regimes should hold
the state to a heavy burden, requiring a clear nexus between the stated need
for the information and the purported interest put forth by the state. And
that evaluation should remain tethered to the fundamental question
underlying expungement: whether the information needs to be public to mete
out desert, not whether it is useful. There is room for the state to meet a
heavy burden that simultaneously allows for preservation of the information
for limited purposes while eﬀectively eliminating much of the unintended
fallout from a record being public.
3. Retributivist Prosecutors and Expungement
The signiﬁcant role of the prosecutor in existing expungement regimes is
undeniable. Prosecutors can delay, oppose, veto, and initiate expungements.
That is a remarkable amount of power that persists in the wake of the
prosecutorial ability to make decisions that aﬀect charging, plea deals, and
sentencing results. Further, there are a signiﬁcant number of prosecutors with
retributivist inclinations themselves, or who wish to serve as the voice of the
desert-based intuitions of their constituencies. How should these prosecutors
interact with expungement procedure given the aforementioned discussion?
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A key realization here is that prosecutors act as the sovereign’s
representative with immense power.272 Being the sovereign’s representative
in the criminal context means that the voice of the prosecutor represents, to
many, if not all, the voice of the state. Thus, a prosecutor’s stance towards
expungement has the capacity to communicate the state’s policy towards
punishment. And it bears remembering that the legislature has already
aﬀorded expungement as a remedy, meaning a prosecutor should have good
reason if she desires to supplant the position of the legislature with a diﬀerent
position on behalf of the state.273
It also means that the prosecutor is in the unique position of trying to
democratically represent notions of desert. This puts prosecutors in quite a
diﬃcult position, tasking them with contemplating and acting upon the
desert-based notions of their constituencies, provided that they are acceptable
within the broader legal framework.
Given that expungement has the capacity to mitigate possibly undeserved
punishment, retributivist prosecutors should be mindful of the proper limits
of state exaction of punishment. In the arrest without conviction context, this
means that retributivist prosecutors should consider a strong presumption in
favor of expungement, absent exceptional circumstances where deserved
punishment would have occurred but for some occurrence that fortunately
favored the defendant.274 For convictions, prosecutors should contemplate a
presumption in favor of expungement once the individual has completed the
prescribed sentence. Prosecutors could work with the legislature to determine

272

The Mississippi Supreme Court recognized this power:
A fearless and earnest prosecuting attorney . . . is a bulwark to the peace, safety and
happiness of the people . . . . [I]t is the duty of the prosecuting attorney, who
represents all the people and has no responsibility except fairly to discharge his duty,
to hold himself under proper restraint and avoid violent partisanship, partiality, and
misconduct which may tend to deprive the defendant of the fair trial to which he is
entitled . . . .

Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 792 (Miss. 1988); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935) (noting how prosecutors are “the representative . . . of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore,
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”); State v.
Pabst, 996 P.2d 321, 328 (Kan. 2000) (“A prosecutor is a servant of the law and a representative of
the people . . . . We are unable to locate an excuse for a prosecutor’s failure to understand the
remarkable responsibility he or she undertakes when rising in a courtroom to announce an
appearance for the State of Kansas.”).
273 See Murray, supra note 17, at 2865 (“Finally, the statute driving the proceeding is not a
prohibition; rather, it is a cause of action providing relief. The very existence of an expungement
regime suggests a conception of justice that leaves room for mercy.”).
274 In other words, where desert is unobjectionable and failing to oppose expungement would
result in an unjustiﬁed windfall for the defendant.
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whether waiting periods are properly calibrated to what was deserved at the
time of formal punishment.
In terms of procedure, prosecutors could make a decision to rarely oppose
expungement in cases where the convicted individual has completed the
assigned sentence. As the agent of the state with respect to the criminal law,
prosecutors overreach when they stall expungement to exact punishment
beyond what was prescribed as part of the sentence. This approach stems from
concerns about proportionality in punishment and the obligations of the state
to not inﬂict suﬀering beyond the demands of the criminal law. Further,
prosecutors should be reluctant to impose onerous procedural hurdles on
petitioners. Finally, prosecutors should strive to treat similar cases similarly.
Institutionally, having clear oﬃce policies that set the parameters of
retributivist constraints is a step in the right direction, rather than having ad
hoc discretionary decisions by front line prosecutors.275
A possible counterargument is that prosecutors might consider the stigma
attached to a public criminal record as a legitimate component of the desert
stemming from a violation of the criminal law. If that is the case, then the
prosecutor must reflect on whether support for the direct sentence requires
reconsideration, or perhaps whether different charges were in order. That
reflection can trickle to future cases. Regardless, the retributivist prosecutor
should be thinking about how the public nature of the criminal record
amplifies the punishment inflicted upon the offender, whether at the phase of
charging, bargaining, or expunging. Failing to do so abrogates the prosecutor’s
role to consider the demands of justice in individual circumstances.276
Some prosecutorial oﬃces have begun to serve as partners in the
expungement process for certain low-level convictions. For example, the
Manhattan District Attorney’s Oﬃce now provides information to would-be
petitioners and has supported eﬀorts by legal aid organizations to bring
expungement relief to broad swaths of the population.277 This type of stateinitiated procedure can be supported by the principles outlined above. As
Terry Curry, elected prosecutor in Marion County said, “[i]f an individual
has stayed out of the criminal justice system, then why should they continue
to have that stain forever?”278 This thinking has led prosecutors in Indiana,
Louisiana, Vermont, and North Carolina to hold expungement clinics.279
275 See Murray, supra note 17, at 2868 (“Another measure that could help to ensure consistency
is the development of a clear oﬃce policy on expungement.”).
276 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
277 See supra note 191.
278 Alan Blinder, Convicts Seeking to Clear Their Records Find More Prosecutors Willing to Help,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/us/expungement-criminaljustice.html [https://perma.cc/68BB-X9SN].
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Then-Governor Mike Pence said, “Indiana should be the worst place in
America to commit a serious crime and the best place, once you’ve done your
time, to get a second chance.”280
Prosecutors can review petitions, set up frameworks to identify eligible
cases and individuals, and notify those individuals themselves or hold clinics
to do so. These individualized practices provide support for the aspirations
appearing in some recent reforms that task state agencies with identifying
eligible individuals. Additionally, they can provide legitimacy to the project
of the criminal law by making prosecutors partners in the restitching of the
social fabric post-punishment.281 Put simply, retributivist prosecutors should
be vigilant about the lines of desert and how expungement limits the state’s
ability to over-punish.
C. Summarizing Desert-Based Expungement
The above sections suggest some parameters for the retributive-based
expungement paradigm. Practically speaking, there are ﬁve criteria that
legislatures should have in mind when thinking about how to apply these
principles:
(1) Tying the time during which a record is public to the desert basis
of the crime, properly distinguishing between crimes;
(2) Ensuring waiting periods for expungement are no longer than
the desert basis;
(3) Establishing a presumption for expungement, or automating it
upon the completion of a sentence or the already determined waiting
period;
(4) Ensuring the state initiates the expungement process to prevent
over-punishment, thereby avoiding onerous procedural hurdles
currently faced by petitioners and reducing costs;
(5) Limiting prosecutorial discretion to oppose expungement to rare
circumstances, and only when there is a clear need for a record to
remain public to further a signiﬁcant interest connected to what was
originally deserved.
These constraints would help establish appropriate ranges for the
duration of public criminal records, and clearly delineate waiting periods,
Id.
See id. (quoting an Indiana deputy prosecutor Andrew Fogle: “If the prosecutor is O.K.
with this, maybe there is something to it.”).
280
281
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calibrated to proportionality principles. In turn, these judgments would be
the primary determinant of eligibility for expungement and permit
automated expungement for some classes of oﬀenses. Second, retributive
expungement would clearly place the burden of persuasion and proof on the
state to retain the data. This would entail a high burden of proof and few
requirements on the former oﬀender. Finally, retributive expungement places
the onus on the state to initiate and complete the expungement process given
the state’s overarching interest in ensuring the limits of the reach of the
criminal law and that punishment is no more than what is deserved.
CONCLUSION
Despite broad substantive expungement reform in recent years, a gap
persists between the remedy, available in theory, and its achievement in
practice. A close examination of expungement procedure—from the origin of
the remedy to the present day—reveals the theoretical underpinnings of the
expungement processes that are preventing expungement: those procedures
are the logical outgrowth of a remedy built on rehabilitative ideals, which
focuses on individuals having to prove their worth. While the past decade has
seen an unprecedented increase in expungement reform, the roots of
expungement only allow so much growth.
The rehabilitative origin of expungement forces petitioners to navigate a
diﬃcult procedural process and places too many burdens on petitioners. This
is the case even when individuals aim to expunge an arrest or a conviction
after serving the complete sentence. Early expungement statutes required
petitioners to prove that they were rehabilitated, either formally at a hearing
or informally through their ability to navigate the diﬃcult landscape of
expungement procedure. Petitioners had to prove their worthiness and that
they were not risky bets. These obstacles to expungement were initially
conceived of as features, allowing the state to delicately balance public safety
with the petitioner’s interests. That framework persists to this day: while
recent reforms in numerous states have broadened eligibility for
expungement, the procedure underlying the remedy remains wedded to
rehabilitative premises, thereby continuing to place the burden on petitioners
to prove that they no longer deserve the stigma-based punishment of a public
criminal record. This interpretive critique of expungement procedure helps
explain the “uptake gap.”
What can be done? Connecting expungement procedure to retributivist
premises would place the burden on the state to justify the continued
existence of public criminal records. Given the punitive eﬀect of public
criminal records and their connection to collateral consequences, the state
should be concerned about imposing extra punishment, beyond what
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petitioners deserve. Expungement should thus focus less on the individual
and more on the state. A retributivist expungement paradigm can trim the
procedural overgrowth that undercuts the promise of expungement reform
and provide solid theoretical footing for automatic, state-initiated
expungement. Retributivist constraints can inform how long records should
remain public and allow for robust procedural protections for ex-oﬀenders
and petitioners for relief, shifting the burden of persuasion to the state. At
the very least, retributivist principles will further conversation as to the limits
of state authority when it comes to punishment, helping to advance the
reentry that individuals deserve.

